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INTRODUCTION
Suppose Jack Plaintiff collides with a truck owned by the United 
States Postal Service and driven by a postal employee who was on his 
way to deliver the mail.  Jack, having suffered serious injuries, files an
administrative claim pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
with the Postal Service on November 16, 1990, claiming that the postal 
employee’s negligence caused Jack’s injuries.  Seven months pass and
Jack does not receive a settlement or denial of his claim.  On June 16,
1991, Jack, by certified mail, sends a letter to the Postal Service in which
he states that he filed an administrative claim more than six months ago 
and that the Service has failed to act on the claim.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2675(a),1 Jack informs the Service that he is deeming his
administrative claim denied due to agency inaction.  Jack then hires an
attorney, provides the attorney with a copy of the administrative claim 
and the deemed-denial letter, and instructs the attorney to file suit.  The 
attorney files suit on June 16, 1992, one year after Jack provided the 
1. Section 2675(a) provides: 
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for 
money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless 
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing 
and sent by certified or registered mail.  The failure of an agency to make final 
disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for 
purposes of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
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Postal Service with written notice that he was deeming his claim denied. 
Now suppose Jill Plaintiff is allegedly exposed to radioactive 
materials by an agency of the United States, and that as a result of the
alleged exposure, she has cancer. Jill files an FTCA claim with the 
relevant federal agency in 1970, claiming that employees of the United
States acting within the scope of their employment negligently exposed 
her to those cancer-causing chemicals.  The agency neither settles nor 
denies the claim, and Jill thereafter deems her administrative claim 
denied by filing suit in federal district court on November 29, 1975.  Jill,
however, is unable to drum up the evidence to prove causation, and her
case is eventually dismissed without prejudice in 1980.  In the interim,
epidemiological studies are conducted that arguably establish a cause-
effect relationship between Jill’s cancer and the chemicals to which she 
was allegedly exposed.  On November 29, 1995, a full twenty years after
she deemed her claim denied, Jill files a second suit in federal district 
court. 
In response to the United States’ contention that the claims are time-
barred because the suits were filed outside of the six-month limitations 
period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), Jack and Jill argue that their
suits are not barred because § 2401(b) does not mention deemed denials,
only formal denials, and the administrative agencies never formally
denied their claims in writing.2 As the law now stands, in certain courts, 
Jack and Jill would likely defeat any argument by the United States that 
their FTCA claims are time-barred.3 Jack’s suit and Jill’s second suit
 2. Section 2401(b) provides: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after
such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by
the agency to which it was presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
3. See Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1013-15 (9th Cir. 1998); Pascale 
v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 187-93 (3d Cir. 1993); Parker v. United States, 935 F.2d 
176, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Arigo v. United States, 980 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (stating in dictum that the six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) does not
apply to deemed denials); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 624 n.36 (2d Cir. 
1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 
701 F. Supp. 386, 388-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the six-month limitations period
in § 2401(b) does not apply to deemed denials).  But see Miller v. United States, 741
F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating in dictum that deemed denials are subject to the 
six-month limitations period prescribed in § 2401(b)); Moore v. United States Postal 
Serv., No. 95-1021, 1995 WL 632365, at *2 n.5 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 1995) (same); 
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would not be time-barred, so the cases say, because, although § 2675(a) 
provides two methods of exhausting FTCA administrative remedies 
(formal denials by federal agencies and deemed denials by FTCA 
claimants), § 2401(b) does not prescribe a limitations period for suits 
brought on the heels of a deemed denial.4 
This oddity in the FTCA poses the following problem.  The FTCA 
represents a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity
that must be strictly construed, and the statute of limitations applicable 
to FTCA actions is intimately tied to that waiver.5 Could it be that 
Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity to the extent
that no limitations period applies to deemed denials?  Did Congress
intend to provide “deemed deniers” a right against the United States
enforceable in perpetuity?  Although commentators have discussed
various aspects of the 1966 amendments to the FTCA,6 no commentator
Catherman v. United States, No. 90-CV-576, 1992 WL 175258, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 21, 
1992) (holding that if an agency does not formally deny a claim within six months after 
the claim is properly presented to a federal agency, the claim is automatically deemed 
denied, thereby triggering the six-month limitations period in § 2401(b)). 
4. See Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1013-15; Pascale, 998 F.2d at 188-89; Arigo, 980
F.2d at 1161; Parker, 935 F.2d at 177; Hannon, 701 F. Supp. at 389. 
5. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). 
6. See Philip H. Corboy, The Revised Federal Tort Claims Act: A Practitioners
View, 2 FORUM 67 (1967) (discussing the 1966 amendments to the FTCA); Philip H.
Corboy, Shielding the Plaintiff’s Achilles’ Heel: Tort Claim Notices to Governmental
Entities, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 609, 635-42 (1979) (discussing the presentment
requirements of the FTCA); Carl T. Grasso, The Statute of Limitations as Applied to
Medical Malpractice Actions Brought Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 117 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (Summer 1987) (discussing Kubrick and accrual); Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th
Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1967) (presenting 
general discussion of 1966 amendments to the FTCA); Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of 
Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 
135 MIL. L. REV. 1 (Winter 1992) (discussing equitable tolling of § 2401(b)); Richard
Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 29 
SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming March 1999) (same); Michaelle F. Pitard, Procedural 
Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 21 LOY. L. REV. 899 (1975) (discussing the 
administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA); Philip Silverman, The Ins and Outs of
Filing a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 41 (1979) 
(discussing the 1966 amendments to the FTCA); Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, 
Limitations of Action Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
1 (1991) (discussing the meaning of accrual in § 2401(b)); Scott D. Stubblebine, Mass 
Toxic Claims Under the F.T.C.A., the First Steps: The Administrative Claim 
Requirement and Statute of Limitations, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 328 (1988) (discussing 
exhaustion and statute of limitations in the context of mass toxic tort claims); Rollin A.
Von Broekhoven, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Administrative Claims, 20 BAYLOR
L. REV. 336 (1967) (discussing administrative-exhaustion procedure in § 2675(a)); Carl 
M. Wagner, United States v. Kubrick: Scope and Application, 120 MIL. L. REV. 139
(Spring 1988) (discussing accrual in § 2401(b)); Donald N. Zillman, Presenting a Claim
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 961 (1983) (discussing the 
presentment requirements of the FTCA); Robert M. Hamblett, Case Comment, 14 
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1428 (1980) (discussing Kubrick and accrual); Daniel M. Katlein, 
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has critically examined the statute of limitations problem posed by
deemed denials—this, despite the fact that an estimated one-third of
administrative claims are deemed denied by the filing of a lawsuit.7 
In this Article, I suggest that, contrary to the conclusion reached by
some courts, Congress did not waive the United States’ sovereign
immunity to the extent that no limitations period applies to deemed
denials. The central thrust of court decisions to the contrary is that the 
FTCA’s statute of limitations is silent with respect to deemed denials,
and that Congress’s silence therefore evinces an intent not to impose a 
limitations period on deemed denials. I argue that this analysis of
congressional silence is fundamentally mistaken, for it ignores the well
established practice of borrowing a state or federal limitations period 
when Congress is silent on the limitations question.  I show that
although the borrowing principle has not been imported into the FTCA 
context, the deemed-denial problem is a perfect candidate for application
of that principle, that a federal (not state) statute of limitations should be 
borrowed, and that the six-month period prescribed in § 2401(b) should 
apply to deemed denials.
Part I provides the background to the statute of limitations problem
posed by the deemed-denial option, presenting the contours of the 
administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA.  Part II demonstrates 
Comment, Administrative Claims and the Substitution of the United States as Defendant 
Under the Federal Drivers Act: The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 29 
EMORY L.J. 755 (1980) (discussing the administrative-settlement process); Note, Claim 
Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice or Substantial 
Documentation?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (1983) (discussing claim-presentation
requirements of the FTCA); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim 
Requirement, 67 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1982) (same). 
7. Interview with Judith Regan, Counsel for the United States Air Force (Jan. 21, 
1998). Commentators have made only passing reference to the deemed-denial/statute of
limitations problem.  See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 6, at 42. In a law review article 
published in the Loyola Law Review over twenty years ago, an Assistant United States
Attorney came closest to discussing the deemed-denial problem: 
If after six months from the date of filing the agency does not formally deny
the claim, the claimant has the option to deem the claim denied and commence 
suit. Presumably, the six month period in which to file suit begins to run from
the time the claimant exercises his option and deems the claim denied;
however, the Tort Claims Act neglects to specify what acts constitute the 
exercise of the option.  While the filing of suit or written notice to the agency
should reasonably constitute exercise of the option, it is conceivable that a 
claimant who takes no affirmative action could extend the statute of limitations
indefinitely. 
Pitard, supra note 6, at 904 (footnote omitted).  Unfortunately, no further discussion of
the problem was provided.
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that the deeming option presents a statute of limitations problem when a
claimant (like Jack) provides an agency written notice of the deemed-
denial decision, or when a claimant (like Jill) files a second suit.  Part II 
also suggests that much of the confusion over the statute of limitations 
applicable to deemed denials arises from a misunderstanding of the 
Justice Department’s position on the issue.  Part III discusses the role 
statutes of limitations play in our civil-liability system, the separation of 
powers problem presented when Congress fails to prescribe a limitations 
period, and introduces the borrowing principle as a statutory
construction tool courts have developed to fill statute of limitations gaps 
left by Congress.  In Part IV, I apply the borrowing principle to the 
deeming option and conclude that courts should impose the six-month
federal limitations period prescribed in § 2401(b) on deemed-denial 
lawsuits.  Finally, Part V shows that court decisions holding that a no-
limitations rule applies to deemed denials are wrongly decided. 
I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. The Evolution of the FTCA’s Administrative-Exhaustion Scheme 
“The King . . . is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of 
thinking wrong,” wrote Blackstone.8 This sentence states quite
succinctly the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which, for a long time,
insulated the United States from liability for torts committed by its
employees.9 Prior to 1946, the only nonmaritime tort remedies available 
to injured persons consisted of suing the government employee 
individually or seeking compensation from Congress through the private 
bill.10 Over time, however, suits against individual government 
employees proved inadequate, Congress was flooded with claims for tort
compensation, and a number of meritorious claims were either never
settled or never heard.11 This system of adjudicating tort claims against 
the government increasingly became the subject of academic criticism,
with some calling for a wholesale change in the tort-claims process.12
 8. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 239. 
9. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). 
10. See German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1893); 1 LESTER S.
JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 2-6 (1982).  The private bill consisted of a
legislative proposal presented to Congress that would provide compensation to an 
individual killed or injured at the hands of a government employee.  See Roscoe Pound, 
The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 37 TUL. L. REV. 685, 689 (1963). 
11. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953); J. Grant McCabe III, 
Observations on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 FORUM 66, 67 (1968). 
12. See, e.g., Irvin M. Gottlieb, Tort Claims Against the United States, 30 GEO.
L.J. 462, 464 (1942); Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the 
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That change came in 1946.  After a long and protracted battle in 
previous Congresses,13 the cumbersome, often inequitable, and 
“notoriously clumsy”14 process of resolving tort claims against the
United States was scrapped with the enactment of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA).  The FTCA waived the United States’ sovereign 
immunity from tort suits arising out of the negligent acts or omissions of 
government employees acting within the scope of their employment.15 
Under the FTCA, the United States is liable to the same extent as a
private person in the place in which the act or omission occurred.16 The
FTCA has the dual benefit of providing injured persons redress for their
injuries while at the same time relieving Congress of the burden of 
earmarking tort compensation through the cumbersome private-bill 
process.17 
Although Congress waived the United States’ immunity from tort suits 
more than fifty years ago, the scope of that waiver still remains far from 
clear. In particular, confusion persists over the mandatory
administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA, confusion that is rooted 
in the changes made to the FTCA since its enactment.  The original 
version of the FTCA did not contain a mandatory administrative-
settlement process. FTCA claimants could submit their tort claims to 
agencies only if the claims amounted to less than $1,000 (later raised to 
$2,500), and claimants were expressly given the option to withdraw their
claims with fifteen-days’ notice to the agency.18 Submitting a tort claim
to the appropriate federal agency was not a condition precedent to filing 
suit in an Article III court.19 In addition, prior to 1966, because 
administrative agencies had limited authority to settle claims, FTCA 
Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 321-22 (1942); Edwin M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925). 
13. See Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act — A Statutory 
Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1946). 
14. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 25. 
15. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-
2680 (1994). There are a number of exceptions to the waiver (found in 28 U.S.C. §
2680), the most notable of which is the discretionary function exception.  See David S.
Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291 (1988-89).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
17. See 1 JAYSON, supra note 10, at 2-6. 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b), repealed and replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
19. See Whistler v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 913, 917 (N.D. Ind. 1966); 
Schlingman v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.D. Cal. 1963). 
 397

























    
 
    
    
   
  
   
 
claimants had an incentive to file suit in an Article III court because,
once in court, the claimant could negotiate a settlement with the Justice 
Department, which was not hamstrung by artificially low settlement 
authority.20 
After the FTCA was enacted in 1946, the Justice Department’s 
experience in handling tort claims revealed that most claims were settled
without the need for expensive and time-consuming litigation.21 Armed 
with this experience, the Department in 1966 presented and Congress 
enacted legislation that changed the FTCA by imposing on FTCA 
claimants a mandatory administrative-exhaustion procedure.  The 1966 
amendments required FTCA claimants first to present their tort claims,
regardless of the dollar amount, to administrative agencies for possible 
settlement. The exhaustion provision is found in § 2675(a), and it
provides in part as follows: 
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States . . . [1] 
unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in
writing and sent by certified or registered mail.  [2] The failure of an agency to
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the
option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim
for purposes of this section.22 
Section 2675(a) of the FTCA precludes claimants from filing suit in
federal district court for six months after the claim is properly presented 
to an administrative agency.  After the six-month period expires,
Congress gave claimants a choice to negotiate further with the agency
until the claim is resolved, or deem the claim denied.  The legislative 
history bears this out:
Under the bill a claimant must file his claim with the agency within two years 
after the claim accrues.  The agency shall have six months to consider the claim
prior to granting or denying it.  At the end of this six month period, if the 
agency does not act, the claimant may at his option elect to regard this inaction
as a final denial and proceed to file suit. 
20. See, e.g., Warren v. United States Dep’t of the Interior Bureau of Land Man., 
724 F.2d 776, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
21. See  HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT TO AUTHORIZE INCREASED AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 6 (1966) 
[hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 1532]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INCREASED AGENCY
CONSIDERATION OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2-
3 (1966) [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 1327]. 
22. Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation:
Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 
(1966) (testimony of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter
Hearings]; see also Mack v. United States Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976). 
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It is recognized that there will be some difficult tort claims that cannot be
processed and evaluated in the six months period given to the agency.  The 
great bulk of them, however, should be ready for decision within this period. 
For those claims that are not ready for decision, we expect that in some
instances the agency will have convinced the claimant that it is sincerely
seeking to reach a fair decision.  Under such circumstances, the claimant might 
well wish not to break off negotiations and file suit.  Thus, even though this six
months period may prove insufficient in some instances, we do not believe that
this period ought to be enlarged to attempt to insure time for final decision on
all claims.23. 
Moreover, the 1966 amendments also eliminated the incentive to file suit 
by raising agencies’ settlement authority to $25,000 and by permitting 
agencies to settle a case for more than that amount with approval from 
the Attorney General of the United States.24 As stated in the legislative
history,
[t]here is good reason to believe that . . . in many . . . cases a claimant may
decide to file suit because of the present limits upon administrative settlement. 
This is because as soon as the case is filed, the Government can negotiate a 
settlement without regard to that limitation.  It does not appear that this
procedure is conducive to efficient claims administration.  The filing of the suit 
and the consequent expense to the Government in preparing the case would
appear to be unnecessarily involved when the case is a proper one for early
settlement.25 
To be sure, imposing an administrative-exhaustion requirement on
claimants who bring tort actions against the sovereign was not a novel 
idea. The 1966 amendments to the FTCA were modeled after similar 
schemes adopted by the States, in which plaintiffs seeking tort damages 
from municipalities were required to submit their claims to appropriate 
state agencies before filing suit in state court.26 These state schemes
“‘protect[ed] the municipality from the expense of needless litigation, 
giv[ing the municipality] an opportunity for investigation, and 
allow[ing] it to adjust differences and settle claims without suit.’”27 In 
23. Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1966) (testimony of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter
Hearings]; see also Mack v. United States Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994). 
25. H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 8; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 4. 
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 3-4.
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7 (quoting 18A EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.153 (3d ed. 1937)); S. REP. NO. 1327, supra
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addition, requiring a claimant first to submit a tort claim to the relevant
state agency puts the municipality on notice that it may be liable in tort,
permitting state agencies “to get their proof in hand before the witnesses 
scatter, and while the facts are fresh in their minds.”28 
In addition to keeping tort claims out of court and permitting federal
agencies to gather relevant evidence, the six-month no-suit period in the 
FTCA also raises administrative-exhaustion questions because the
previous version of § 2675(b) permitted FTCA claimants to withdraw 
their administrative claims with fifteen days’ notice to the agency.29 
Plainly, former § 2675(b) provided FTCA claimants the option of 
backing out of the administrative process at any time if (1) agency delay
somehow compromised the claimant’s ability to pursue a claim in an
Article III court,30 or (2) the claimant believed she could get a better deal 
by filing suit and negotiating a settlement with the Justice Department.
The 1966 amendments preserved the claimant’s option to withdraw from 
the administrative-settlement process and at the same time imposed the 
six-month mandatory no-suit period to encourage fruitful settlement
negotiations, and perhaps settlement itself, with administrative 
agencies.31 
As the text of § 2675(a) makes clear, Congress put the deeming option 
on the same exhaustion footing as a formal denial by defining both as a 
“final denial” for purposes of FTCA administrative exhaustion.32 
Because similar terms in a statute are to be accorded the same
meaning,33 § 2675(a) speaks of one “final denial” that can be achieved in
two different ways.  This conclusion also follows logically from the 
plain language of § 2675(a), which states in part that a deemed denial is 
“a final denial . . . for purposes of this section,” and from the legislative 
history, which defines a final denial alternatively as a written or 
note 21, at 4 (same). 
28. 18A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.153
(3d ed. 1937 & rev. 1993). 
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b), repealed and replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
(1994).
30. See Gottlieb, supra note 13, at 24 (stating that the withdrawal provision “will 
prevent the claimant from suffering undue delay and leave in his hands the initiative for
expeditious action”). 
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 4 (“Subsection (b) amends
subsection (b) of section 2675 by deleting the first sentence of the subsection.  This 
sentence is in effect replaced by the provision of subsection (a) of section 2675, as 
amended, which states that after 6 months without final action, the individual at his own
option can deem the claim to be finally denied and be free to commence suit.”); S. REP. 
NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 7. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
33. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995). 
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“deemed” denial.34 Accordingly, exhaustion of administrative remedies 
(i.e., final administrative denials) for purposes of the FTCA includes
formal, written denials and deemed denials.  Courts have so held.35 
From an exhaustion standpoint, what happens when the six-month
settlement period expires and a federal agency has not yet settled or 
denied the administrative claim?  The answer is nothing—a limitations 
period does not begin running nor is the claim automatically deemed
denied or formally denied six months and one day after the claim is 
submitted to the agency.  Rather, if six months passes and the agency 
has not acted on the tort claim, the only change (from an exhaustion 
standpoint) is that the option to deem a claim denied is triggered.  That 
does not mean, of course, that the claimant alone has the power to
exhaust her administrative remedies through a deemed denial.  The 
agency remains free formally to deny the claim at any time after the six-
month settlement period expires, but before the claimant exercises the 
deeming option.36 Plainly, this is how the United States can avoid 
lengthy delays in suits filed against it. 
The FTCA’s revised settlement scheme promotes a number of policy 
objectives. By encouraging settlement of tort claims within 
administrative agencies,37 Congress intended to reduce court congestion 
and avoid unnecessary litigation.38  Plainly, to the extent that claims are
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra
note 21, at 8; S.REP. NO. 1327. supra note 21, at 5. 
35. See Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1013-15 (9th Cir. 1998); Pascale 
v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 188 (3d Cir. 1993); Arigo v. United States, 980 F.2d
1159, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1992); Parker v. United States, 935 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1991);
McCallister v. United States, 925 F.2d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Conn v.
United States, 867 F.2d 916, 920-21 (6th Cir. 1989); Stahl v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 
86,88 (D. Kan. 1990); Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1129-30 (W.D. Pa. 
1980); see also Silverman. supra note 6, at 60. 
36. See McCallister, 925 F.2d at 843; Conn, 867 F.2d at 920-21; Anderson ex rel. 
Anderson v. United States, 803 F.2d 1520, 1522 (9th Cir. 1986); Stahl, 732 F. Supp. at
88; Chambly v. Lindy, 601 F. Supp. 959, 963-64 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Boyd, 482 F. Supp. at
1129-30; Mack v. United States Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
37. See  HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT, H.R. REP. NO. 89-
1534, at 3 (1966) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 1534]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE
GOVERNMENT, S. REP. NO. 89-1328, at 2 (1966) [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 1328]; H.R.
REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 3, 6-8, 10; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 2, 3, 5-6, 
11. 
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 6, 8, 10, 12; H.R. REP. NO. 1534, 
supra note 36, at 3; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 2, 4, 10, 13; S. REP. NO. 1328, 
supra note 36, at 2. 
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settled within agencies, suits are not filed in district court, thereby
decreasing judicial case loads.  Moreover, the 1966 amendments to the
FTCA were intended to create a dispute resolution framework that is fair
to FTCA claimants as well as the United States.39 The primary benefit
accruing to the United States, and in particular the Justice Department, is
that the settlement of claims within administrative agencies frees up
limited Department resources for more pressing matters.40 At the same
time, the administrative-settlement scheme benefits FTCA claimants by 
permitting them to forego the expense of full-blown litigation.41 It is
clear, therefore, that the administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA
benefits all relevant parties (courts, claimants, agencies, and the Justice
Department) with a system of dispute resolution that was more efficient
and equitable.42 
B. Administrative Exhaustion and Article III Jurisdiction 
The FTCA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement contains a 
jurisdictional component, so that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing an FTCA suit in federal court, a 
prerequisite that cannot be waived.43 This concept of exhaustion first, 
jurisdiction second is grounded in two well settled principles.  First, the 
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity is tied to § 2675(a), such
that “the right to sue the government exists only by virtue of § 2675, 
which fixes the terms and conditions on which suit may be instituted.”44 
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 6; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 2; Hearings, supra note 22, at 15. 
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 6; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 2; Hearings, supra note 22, at 15. 
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 3; Hearings, supra note 22, at 15. 
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 10 (statement by Attorney
General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach); S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 10 (same). 
43. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993); Bruns v. National 
Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1997); Simpkins v. District of
Columbia Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Porter v. Fox, 99 F.3d 271, 274 
(8th Cir. 1996); Price v. United States, 81 F.3d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 295 (1996); Ahmed v. United States, 30 F.3d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1109 (1994); Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 1993); Pipkin v. United
States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 273 (10th Cir. 1991); Plyler v. United States, 900 F.2d
41, 42 (4th Cir. 1990); Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir.
1989); GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 916 n.86 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Henderson
v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 
808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d 812, 814-15 (1st 
Cir. 1980); Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972). 
44. Plyler, 900 F.2d at 42; see Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
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A condition for filing suit against the United States is that an FTCA
claimant first submit her tort claim to the relevant federal agency for
possible settlement and wait six months before filing suit in federal
district court. Failure to do so deprives federal district courts of
jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim.45 Second, exhaustion of
administrative remedies means that all administrative remedies
prescribed by Congress have been pursued unsuccessfully.46 That leaves 
an FTCA claimant with the option of turning to an Article III court in the 
hopes that she may be awarded compensation there. 
The respective jurisdiction of administrative agencies and federal
courts is central to any garden-variety exhaustion scheme like the FTCA.
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” the Supreme
Court has said, “is one among related doctrines . . . that govern the 
timing of federal-court decisionmaking.”47 Providing agencies the first 
shot at resolving a claim suggests that agency expertise should, in the 
first instance, be brought to bear on the legal claim asserted.48 So, for
example, when Congress amended the FTCA in 1966 and imposed on 
claimants a mandatory administrative-settlement process, Congress 
recognized the indispensability of agency expertise in the resolution of
tort claims brought against the United States.49 That expertise, in turn, 
should (or so Congress thought) result in less litigation because claims 
that would ordinarily be adjudicated in an Article III court, perhaps even 
without agency input, would now be resolved within the agency.50 
45. See, e.g., McNeil, 508 U.S. at 110-13 (holding that failure to present tort claim 
to administrative agency divests federal district court of jurisdiction over the claim); 
Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that suit filed 
within six months after an administrative claim was filed with the agency deprives 
federal district court of jurisdiction over the claim). 
46. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1992); McKart v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 
41, 50-51 (1938); Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1985) (construing
§ 2675(a) of the FTCA). 
47. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. 
48. See id. at 145; Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986);
McKart, 395 U.S. at 194; Israel Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its 
Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315, 315, 329-30, 335-37 (1956); Louis L. Jaffe, Primary
Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38 (1964); Note, Primary Jurisdiction —
Effect of Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1251
(1938) [hereinafter Primary Jurisdiction].
49. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 3.
50. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 3.
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Intimately connected to the agency-expertise rationale behind
administrative-exhaustion schemes is the well recognized notion that 
agencies have “primary jurisdiction” over legal claims.51 This means, of 
course, that a claim filed in an Article III court, either before that claim 
was submitted to an agency or before the prescribed administrative 
process has been exhausted, deprives an Article III court of jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the claim.  In this way, the doctrine of administrative 
exhaustion ensures that federal agencies exercise their authority to 
adjudicate claims without undue interference from Article III courts, 
while at the same time promoting judicial efficiency by keeping out of 
court claims susceptible to resolution at the administrative level.52 
The principle of primary jurisdiction finds its expression in the FTCA, 
for it is well settled that an FTCA suit filed before a claim is presented to 
an agency or before the six-month no-suit period expires precludes 
federal district courts from considering the claim.53 At the same time, the
converse is also true; that is, once an administrative claim has been
finally denied, an agency’s primary jurisdiction is terminated altogether.
When a claim is finally denied by the agency or deemed denied by the
claimant, there is nothing left for the agency to do; the claimant has
complied with the administrative process and come away empty-handed. 
But an agency’s expertise is not conclusive, for conferring on agencies 
primary jurisdiction over FTCA claims does not preclude Article III 
jurisdiction if the claimant is unsuccessful in the administrative 
process.54 The FTCA claimant’s “consolation prize,” if you will, is that
upon exhaustion, she receives a jurisdictional ticket to federal district
court. 
What that ticket buys the claimant depends upon the nature of the final 
denial. With respect to formal denials and written-notice deemed
51. See, e.g., McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145; United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 
652-53 (1949); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418, 420 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (opinion of Wisdom, J.); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 
179 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1950); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Aeromatic Travel Corp., 341 
F. Supp. 1271, 1280 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway
Comm’n, 224 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Iowa 1974); Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981, 993-94 (1939); Jaffe, supra note 48, at 
1037-38; Primary Jurisdiction, supra note 48, at 1251-52. 
52. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145. 
53. See supra note 43 (authorities cited therein). 
54. To be sure, if the FTCA claimant accepts a settlement offer from the agency,
Article III jurisdiction is eliminated.
The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement
shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete
release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the 
government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the 
same subject matter. 
28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994). 
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denials, the FTCA claimant floats in jurisdictional limbo, for neither the 
agency (because there has been a “final denial” of the claim) nor an 
Article III court (because no lawsuit has yet been filed) have jurisdiction 
over the claim.  However, if a claimant exercises the deeming option by
filing a lawsuit, a federal district court maintains “exclusive jurisdiction” 
over the claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).55 And federal district 
courts logically have exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits filed on the 
heels of a formal or written-notice denial. Thus, once FTCA 
administrative remedies are exhausted and a suit in federal district court 
has been filed against the United States, state courts, federal agencies, or
any other bodies are deprived of jurisdiction to adjudicate the tort 
claim.56 
55. 	 Section 1346(b)(1) provides: 
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together 
with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil 
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on
and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, 
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).  See Kanar v. 
United States, 118 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.) 
(holding that § 1346(b) is the statute which invests federal district courts with
jurisdiction over an FTCA claim); Rutkofske v. United States, No. 95-2038, 
1997 WL 299382, at *2 (6th Cir. June 4, 1997) (same); Cupit v. United States, 
964 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 & n.2 (W.D. La. 1997) (same). 
56. In an unpublished decision, the D.C. Circuit appears to have confirmed this 
reading of the administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA.  In Daniel v. Wolpert, No. 
93-5094, 1993 WL 485640, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1993) (per curiam), the court 
reversed a district court’s order of dismissal, holding among other things that the plaintiff 
had stated a claim under the FTCA.  Because the opinion is short, it is difficult to
determine precisely the facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s FTCA claim. 
Nevertheless, the court did discuss administrative exhaustion.  The facts showed that the 
plaintiff filed an administrative claim in July 1992 and deemed his claim denied by filing 
suit on March 1993. Approximately five months after the plaintiff deemed his claim 
denied, the agency handling the plaintiff’s claim interposed a formal denial.  The D.C. 
Circuit, however, held that the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies when
he deemed his claim denied.  Id. at *1. Daniel, therefore, supports the view that 
interposing a formal denial after an FTCA claimant has deemed a claim denied has no
legal effect.  I shall have more to say about this later.  See infra Part IV.B.2.b (discussing 
the meritless contention that interposing a formal denial after a deemed denial precludes
the application of the borrowing principle). 
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II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEM POSED BY THE DEEMED-
DENIAL OPTION OF THE FTCA
A. The Problem 
The FTCA’s statute of limitations, § 2401(b), imposes two limitations 
periods on claimants.  The claimant must first submit an administrative 
claim to the relevant federal agency within two years after the claim 
accrues.57 The claimant then has six months after the agency formally 
denies the claim in writing, by certified or registered mail, to file suit in 
federal district court.58 Like most exhaustion schemes, the FTCA statute
of limitations is triggered at two distinct times — when the claim 
accrues and when administrative remedies have been exhausted.59 In the
FTCA context, then, the two-year period in § 2401(b) prescribes a time
limit within which a claimant must submit her claim to an administrative 
agency, and the six-month period prescribes a time limit within which a 
claimant must file suit in an Article III court.  These limitations periods 
represent the balance Congress struck between the competing policies
underlying statutes of limitations, and because the FTCA’s statute of 
limitations is intimately connected to the United States’ waiver of 
sovereign immunity, courts are not free to expand those time periods.60 
The six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) is at the center of the
statute of limitations problem in the FTCA.  Specifically, although the 
FTCA provides for formal and deemed-denial methods of exhausting 
administrative remedies, § 2401(b) prescribes a six-month limitations
period only for formal-denial suits.61 Section 2401(b) on its face says 
nothing about deemed denials.  Prior to 1966, when the FTCA permitted
claimants to withdraw their administrative claims, § 2401(b) prescribed
57. 	 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).  Section 2401(b) provides: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after
such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by
the agency to which it was presented.
Id. 
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 507, 511-12 
(1967); Group Health Inc. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 753, 762-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(and authorities cited therein). 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Manko v. 
United States, 830 F.2d 831, 839 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117-18). 
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
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a six-month limitations period for withdrawals.62 In 1966, however,
Congress “simplif[ied]” § 2401(b) to comport with the new mandatory
administrative exhaustion scheme codified in § 2675(a).63 
Congress’s simplification of § 2401(b) lays the groundwork for the
statute of limitations problem posed by the deeming option.  To begin 
with, an examination of § 2675(a) and the legislative history 
accompanying that provision suggests that Congress did not anticipate
that the deemed-denial option would raise a statute of limitations 
problem at all.  As explained below,64 § 2675(a) does not prescribe a 
particular method of deeming a claim denied.  That section simply says
that the FTCA claimant has the “option” to deem a claim denied, but the
text of § 2675(a) does not define “option” or “deemed.”65 The legislative
history, however, suggests that Congress anticipated that most FTCA 
claimants would deem their claims denied by filing a lawsuit,66 even 
though § 2675(a) does not prohibit FTCA claimants from deeming their 
claims denied by, for example, providing an agency written notice of
their deemed-denial decision.  Of course, if an administrative claim is
deemed denied through the filing of a lawsuit, the statute of limitations 
applicable to that suit arguably becomes irrelevant.  In fact, it would 
have made no sense for Congress to provide a limitations period for 
deemed denials in § 2401(b) because every deemed-denial suit would, 
by definition, be timely.
Yet, deeming a claim denied does raise statute of limitations problems 
if (1) the claimant deems a claim denied by performing some act short of 
filing suit (i.e., written notice to the agency), or (2) after deeming the 
claim denied by filing suit, the claimant’s first suit is dismissed without
prejudice and a second suit is later filed. These two classes of cases— 
which, for simplicity’s sake, I shall call the “written-notice” and 
“second-suit” problems, respectively—represent the statute of 
limitations gap created by the deemed-denial option of the FTCA. 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), repealed and replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1966). 
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 5; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 8.
64. See infra Part IV.A.1.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
66. See S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 7 (“After the claim has been presented
to the agency and 6 months passes without final disposition of the claim, the claimant is 
expressly given the option to consider the claim as denied and to file suit.” (emphasis 
added)); H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 4 (same); Hearings, supra note 22, at 13
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Douglas to the effect that once the six-month
period expires, FTCA claimants have the option to deem the claim denied by filing suit). 
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Because § 2401(b) on its face does not address the deeming option, the 
question naturally arises whether a limitations period should apply to the
written-notice and second-suit problems. Given that Congress has 
charged the Justice Department, and, in particular, the Civil Division, 
with the primary responsibility of interpreting the FTCA,67 an analysis of 
the statute of limitations problem posed by the deemed-denial option 
begins with a consideration of the Justice Department’s position on the 
question.
B. The Position of the Justice Department
An analysis of the Department’s position must keep two issues
separate.  The first is whether a limitations period is triggered at the 
expiration of the six-month settlement period, imposing on the FTCA 
claimant a time period within which she must deem her claim denied. 
The second, a fundamentally different issue, is whether a limitations 
period begins to run once the FTCA claimant takes action deeming her 
claim denied.  The Justice Department has taken a firm position on the 
first issue, but not the second.
1. The Department’s Position in 1966 
The Justice Department drafted the 1966 amendments to the FTCA, 
and Assistant Attorney General John W. Douglas provided the only
testimony before the House on the purpose of the new amendments.68 In 
his testimony, Douglas stated explicitly that the six-month limitations 
period prescribed in § 2401(b) applies to formal denials and when an
agency “refuses to act.”69 There is nothing in the legislative history 
accompanying the 1966 amendments to suggest that no statute of 
limitations applies once an FTCA claimant deems a claim denied. 
2. The Department’s Position in 1990 
The Department’s position on the limitations question, at least as far
as the courts see it, appears to have changed in 1990. Now, the 
Department allegedly endorses the view that no statute of limitations
applies to deemed denials.70 This “position” emerged from the 
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 9; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, 
at 5.
68. See IRVIN M. GOTTLIEB, A NEW APPROACH TO THE HANDLING OF TORT CLAIMS
AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN 26 (1967).
69. Hearings, supra note 22, at 18. 
70. See Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Department’s concession in Taumby v. United States (Taumby I).71 
The facts of Taumby I are critical to a proper understanding of the
Justice Department’s position on the limitations issue.  Taumby filed a 
medical malpractice claim with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).  Shortly
after receiving the claim, BOP sent Taumby a letter that informed him 
that the agency had six months within which to consider Taumby’s 
claim.  Four days after the six-month period expired, BOP denied 
Taumby’s claim.  However, Taumby was not properly notified because 
the denial letter was either misfiled or lost.  Thus, as far as Taumby was
concerned, BOP had not acted on his claim.  Approximately one year 
after BOP denied Taumby’s claim, Taumby filed suit in federal district
court. Taumby stated in his complaint that because BOP failed to act on 
his claim within six months, he deemed the claim denied.  The district
court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss the case on the 
ground that it was time-barred by the six-month limitations period set 
forth in § 2401(b). 
The issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether expiration of the six-
month settlement period triggered a limitations period.  The court 
concluded, after reviewing the legislative history of the 1966 
amendments, that a limitations period is triggered at the end of the six-
month settlement period, but that the six-month time limit in § 2401(b) 
does not apply because § 2401(b) does not mention deemed denials.72 
The Eighth Circuit imposed its own “reasonable-time” limitation,
concluding as follows: 
When Congress revised section 2675(a) in 1966, it did not formally address 
what would happen if a party, faced with no formal agency disposition six
months after filing a claim, simply failed to act for a long period of time.  We 
believe that such behavior runs contrary to the policies supporting both the 
FTCA and its statute of limitations, and we cannot be certain it was considered
by Congress.  We are concerned that adopting Taumby’s contrary reading of
section 2675(a) would fly in the face of the FTCA, its statute of limitations, and
the legislative history of the section, because, it would, in essence, reward
claimants for doing nothing.73 
The Justice Department argued on rehearing that the Taumby I panel 
incorrectly interpreted § 2675(a).  The Department’s brief on rehearing 
stated that: 
71. 902 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated on reh’g, 919 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(Taumby II).
72. Taumby I, 902 F.2d at 1366. 
73. Id. at 1365-66. 
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It is defendant’s position that—as the [] dissent in the case at bar argues, and as
the court in Conn v. United States held—there is no time limit for the filing of
an FTCA action when an administrative claim is deemed to be denied under 28
U.S.C. 2675(a) by virtue of an agency’s failure to finally dispose of the claim
within six months. We concur in the view that the statutory language—which
states in pertinent part that “[t]he failure of an agency to make final disposition
of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant
any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section”—is plain and unambiguous, and mandates the conclusion that a 
claimant is free to bring suit at any time after the expiration of the six-month 
period prescribed in section 2675(a). 
. . . .
In the event that the “open-ended” character of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) poses a 
serious problem, defendant will seek an appropriate legislative solution.74 
After stating that the plain language of the statute controlled and that the 
legislative history accompanying § 2675(a) was irrelevant, the Justice
Department nonetheless noted that the legislative history comported with 
the plain language of the statute, such that no limitations period begins 
to run at the expiration of the six-month settlement period.75 
Given the Department’s reversal on rehearing, it is important to know 
exactly what the Department conceded.  Plainly, the Justice Department
did not concede that after an FTCA claimant deems a claim denied, no 
statute of limitations is triggered.  Rather, consistent with the facts of
Taumby’s suit and the cases,76 the Department argued that (1) the mere 
expiration of the six-month settlement period, without any action taken 
by the claimant or the agency, does not automatically deem a claim 
denied; and (2) no limitations period is triggered at the conclusion of the 
six-month settlement period if the agency does not formally deny the 
claim or the claimant does not take action to deem the claim denied.77 
Unfortunately, the Justice Department’s concession can be construed 
as somewhat ambiguous because the first sentence in the quoted portion 
of the United States’ brief is much broader than the second sentence. 
The first sentence seems to state the sweeping proposition that no 
limitations period applies to all deemed denials—in other words, that § 
2675(a) somehow solves the written-notice and second-suit problems. 
74. Appellee’s Response to Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, at 5-6, 8, Taumby II (No. 89-1516WM) (first emphasis added). 
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., GOTTLIEB, supra note 68, at 6-7 (“Because of loose legislative
draftsmanship, there is no cutoff period within which suit must be brought other than six
months after the mailing of the notic [sic] of the denial of the claim by the agency.  If the
claimant does not elect to file court action at the end of six months of inaction, this
makes it quite possible, though improbable, that a suit may be filed in court several years 
after the filing of a claim with the appropriate administrative agency.”).
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But Taumby I did not address either of these problems.  Taumby never 
received a formal denial from the agency, never took any action (before
filing suit) indicating that he deemed his administrative claim denied, 
and never filed a second suit. 
On rehearing, the Eighth Circuit in Taumby II reversed itself on the
limitations issue and held that no limitations period was triggered at the 
conclusion of the six-month settlement period.78 Taumby II thus far has 
precluded the Justice Department from so much as hinting that any
statute of limitations begins to run once an FTCA claimant exercises the
deeming option.  In fact, the Third Circuit has since cited the decision as
suggesting that the Justice Department “implicitly” conceded that no
limitations period applies once an FTCA claimant deems her claim 
denied.79 But the concession in Taumby II addresses a fundamentally
different question than the statute of limitations problem posed by the 
deemed-denial option of the FTCA. Nothing the Justice Department 
said in Taumby II precludes the Department from arguing that a 
limitations period is triggered once an FTCA claimant takes some 
action—written notice to the agency or, as in Taumby I, filing a 
lawsuit—that deems a claim denied.
A contrary conclusion would suggest that the Justice Department 
argued in Taumby II that the “any time thereafter” language in § 2675(a) 
prescribes the limitations period for deemed denials.  However, that
would mean that the Department asserted a self-defeating position in
Taumby II. Remember, the Department argued on rehearing that, 
contrary to the holding in Taumby I, no limitations period is 
automatically triggered at the conclusion of the six-month settlement 
period.80 Of course, if § 2675(a) is the statute of limitations for deemed
denials, a limitations period would in fact be triggered when the six-
month settlement period expires, giving deemed deniers an indefinite 
period within which to file suit.81 This construction of the FTCA not
only overlooks the well settled fact that an agency is free to issue a 
formal denial any time before a claimant exercises the deeming option, 
but, more importantly, suggests that an FTCA claim is automatically
78. Taumby v. United States, 919 F.2d 69, 70, 72 (8th Cir. 1990) (emphasis 
added).
79. See Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1993). 
80. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (arguing that limitations period 
in the FTCA is triggered when administrative remedies are exhausted).
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deemed denied six months and one day after a tort claim is properly 
presented to the appropriate federal agency. Both of these
interpretations of the FTCA flatly contradict the Justice Department’s 
position in Taumby II. 
C. Conclusions 
A number of important points emerge from the statute of limitations
problem posed by deemed denials.  To begin with, when Congress 
amended the FTCA in 1966 and imposed a mandatory administrative-
settlement process on FTCA claimants, Congress did not account for the 
deemed-denial method of exhaustion in the statute of limitations 
applicable to lawsuits brought at the conclusion of an unsuccessful
settlement process. This omission, of course, raises the question of 
whether courts should interpret the 1966 amendments as providing
deemed deniers rights against the United States that are enforceable in
perpetuity or whether Congress had something else in mind.  Moreover, 
the Justice Department’s concession in Taumby II does not prevent the 
Department from asserting that a limitations period does in fact apply to 
suits brought on the heels of a deemed denial. 
In light of these background principles, courts may use a variety of
tools to resolve the statute of limitations problem posed by the deemed-
denial option of the FTCA.  In particular, the next section examines the 
role of statutes of limitations in our civil-liability system, discusses the 
method of statutory construction used to divine congressional intent in 
the statute of limitations context, and ultimately unveils the tool that may
close the statute of limitations gap in the FTCA—the borrowing
principle.
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE 
BORROWING PRINCIPLE
A. Statutes of Limitations and the Policies They Promote 
Statutes of limitations operate to extinguish persons’ rights regardless 
of the merits of a legal claim.  This is especially true, for example, in the
context of toxic-tort litigation. As Professor Green has observed,
plaintiffs are often barred from bringing causes of action because the 
necessary epidemiological evidence is unavailable within the prescribed
limitations period—epidemiological evidence that may later reveal the 
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viability of the injured person’s claim.82 Professor Green has proposed, 
in his words, the “revolutionary” solution of abolishing all statutes of 
limitations in toxic-tort cases in which the plaintiff suffers from an 
insidious disease.83 
Interestingly, the FTCA accounts somewhat for Professor Green’s
concerns about statutes of limitations.  The FTCA does so, however, 
without endorsing the drastic proposition that limitations periods should 
be eliminated.  Rather, by permitting FTCA claimants who have not 
received formal denials of their claims to delay deeming their claim 
denied until “any time” after the mandatory six-month settlement period 
expires, FTCA claimants may wait, gather the relevant evidence to prove
a toxic-tort claim, and then deem the claim denied.  In other words, if a
claimant does not receive a formal denial from an agency, the FTCA
gives claimants an indefinite period within which they may exhaust their 
administrative remedies, an option that buys claimants time to obtain the
evidence that Professor Green states is often unavailable within 
restrictive limitations periods. 
Nevertheless, Professor Green’s proposal to eliminate limitations 
periods in the toxic-tort context raises the question of the role of statutes
of limitations in our civil-liability scheme generally.  Professor Epstein 
has suggested that statutes of limitations have the benefit of “forc[ing] a
plaintiff to sue early in the process or forever hold his peace.”84 But why 
should this be so?  The answer is largely historical.  Despite their 
perceived harshness, statutes of limitations have always been considered
necessary to the orderly administration of justice.85 Writing in 1805,
Chief Justice Marshall said that a federal cause of action “brought at any
distance of time [would] . . . be utterly repugnant to the genius of our
82. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic 
Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 989-1010 (1988); see also Note, The 
Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1683, 1684-86 (1983) (arguing that rejecting the discovery-of-damage accrual
rule operates to deprive toxic tort plaintiffs of their constitutional liberty and property
rights); Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to 
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 575, 580-81 (1983) (arguing that traditional rules governing discovery of
one’s injury should not apply in the toxic-tort context).
83. Green, supra note 82, at 968. 
84. Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1183 (1986). 
85. Imposing a limitations period on causes of action dates back to Roman Law 
and early English common law.  See Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 
63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177-79 (1950) [hereinafter Statutes of Limitations].
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laws.”86 There must be, the Supreme Court has since said, “some 
definitely ascertainable period [that signifies] an end to litigation.”87 
Thus, imposing time limitations on causes of action achieves 
predictability.88  Predictability, in turn, inures to the benefit of 
defendants, courts, and society as a whole.  Statutes of limitations permit 
defendants to structure their affairs without the fear of later having to 
defend stale claims; courts need not preside over lawsuits in which 
evidence has spoiled or disappeared, witnesses’ memories have faded,
and the witnesses themselves have died; and society benefits because
scarce judicial resources will not be squandered on ultimately
unprovable claims.89  Statutes of limitations, in short, are premised on
the value of repose, which in its most basic sense provides individuals 
with the “comfort of knowing that [they] no longer [have] the threat of a 
legal action looming over [them].”90 
The benefits of repose are realized because statutes of limitations 
impose on plaintiffs a requirement that they pursue their causes of action
with diligence.91 Captured by the long-standing maxim that “[e]quity 
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights,”92 the diligence 
requirement plainly goes hand-in-hand with protecting courts and
defendants from adjudicating or defending stale claims.  A plaintiff who
proceeds diligently does not put courts and defendants in the 
compromising position of having to adjudicate and respond to factual 
contentions that, with the passage of time, have dimmed in clarity. 
Viewed from this perspective, statutes of limitations can be seen as a 
legislative device for punishing plaintiffs who have slept on their 
rights.93 
In addition to promoting these process-based concerns, statutes of 
limitations also vindicate substantive legislative policy objectives.  In
tort law, for example, Professor Epstein has suggested that limitations 
periods ensure that the policies underlying tort-liability schemes in 
86. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805). 
87. Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 65 (1926). 
88. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989). 
89. See Epstein, supra note 84, at 1181-82; Green, supra note 82, at 980-82. 
90. See Green, supra note 82, at 981; see also Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J.
Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 460-83 
(1997) (discussing statutes of limitations and the value of repose); Statutes of 
Limitations, supra note 85, at 1185-86 (same). 
91. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 91, at 488-92. 
92. 2 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 418-19 (5th
ed. 1941) (“Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit”); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. 
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983). 
93. See Nathan Kahan, Statutes of Limitations Problems in Cases of Insidious 
Diseases: The Development of the Discovery Rule, 2 J. PROD. LIAB. 127, 136 (1978). 
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general are not undermined.94 This is so, argues Professor Epstein, 
because
[t]he length of the interval between cause and effect—or more generally the 
length of the interval between the constellation of facts that generate tort
liability and the liability itself—is critical to the operation of the system.  With
the passage of time, the evidence available regarding a given legal issue 
necessarily becomes stale.  The reliability of any determination thus decreases,
and with it the effectiveness of the system no matter its objectives.  If factual
determinations are less than 100 percent reliable, there is a loss in making social 
objectives operational, whether the objective is compensation or deterrence, 
liberty or efficiency.  The signal is weakened by the noise in transmission.95 
The same can be said in the context of congressional waivers of the 
United States’ sovereign immunity.  Specifically, when Congress waives 
the United States’ immunity from suit, congressionally prescribed
statutes of limitations place bounds upon the waiver by contracting the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.96  The FTCA is a good example.  Because 
compliance with § 2401(b) is jurisdictional,97 it operates as a 
jurisdiction-limiting statute as well as a statute that vindicates the value
of repose. By circumscribing an Article III court’s power of judicial 
review, Congress protects the public fisc by cutting off persons’ right to 
sue the United States, thereby freeing up government resources for more 
immediately relevant matters.98  Accordingly, unless Congress clearly 
indicates otherwise, applying the limitations period in § 2401(b) to 
FTCA suits protects the United States from having to dip into the public
fisc to compensate individuals whose tort claims, because of the passage
 94. Epstein, supra note 84, at 1181. 
95. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role 
of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 534-43 (1984) 
(discussing the effects of long limitations periods on deterrence, risk allocation, and 
regulatory costs). 
96. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review 
of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV. 733, 741-42 (1983) (arguing that imposing limitations period
on challenges to federal statute operates as a congressional limit on Article III review). 
97. See Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. 
United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Parker & Collela, supra note 
6. But see Glarner v. United States, Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that § 2401(b) requirements are not jurisdictional); Schmidt v.
United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991) (same). 
98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 6; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 
21, at 2; Hearings, supra note 22, at 15; see also Statutes of Limitations, supra note 85, 
at 1186 (“[L]imitations on private actions against the sovereign serve the purpose not so 
much of fairness as of public convenience.”). 
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of time, may not rest on an accurate factual foundation.99  This certainly 
explains why courts strictly construe § 2401(b) and reach what some 
may say are “harsh” results.100 
Of course, one may argue that, in the deemed-denial context, because
Congress provided FTCA claimants an indefinite time period within 
which to exhaust their administrative remedies and because the
administrative-exhaustion requirement permits federal agencies to gather
relevant evidence while that evidence is still fresh, the United States’ 
interest in repose is at its lowest ebb. So, the argument would go, if a 
federal agency fails to adjudicate a claim and the claimant waits a few
years before exercising the deeming option—a result consistent with the
plain terms of § 2675(a)—the United States cannot complain that it must 
thereafter defend an arguably stale claim.  However, that a claimant may
wait indefinitely before exercising the deeming option is no reason to 
conclude that, once the claimant has exhausted her administrative 
remedies, the United States’ interest in repose vanishes. Indeed, 
precisely the opposite is true: As time passes, witness’ memories fade
and documents may be destroyed, regardless of who may be 
“responsible” for the delay and irrespective of whether the agency
collected evidence early in the process.  Nor does the passage of time on
the exhaustion end diminish in any way the claimant’s responsibility to 
act diligently once she exhausts her FTCA administrative remedies.  The 
United States’ interest in repose is as strong in cases involving deemed
denials as it is in cases involving formal denials. 




When Congress specifies a limitations period for a civil cause of
action, it expresses its judgment that the policies generally promoted by 
statutes of limitations apply to the statute for which the limitations 
period has been prescribed. Congress, however, is not always so
comprehensive.  Just a few terms ago, for example, the Supreme Court 
noted that “[a] look at this Court’s docket in recent years will show how 
often federal statutes fail to provide any limitations period for the causes 
of action they create . . . .”101  What are courts to do when Congress
99. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (interpreting the 
FTCA, and explaining that statutes of limitations “protect defendants and the courts from 
having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the 
loss of evidence”).
100. See, e.g., Bradley v. United States ex rel. Veterans Admin., 951 F.2d 268, 270-
71 (10th Cir. 1991). 
101. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995). 
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creates a federal cause of action but does not enact a statute of 
limitations applicable to that cause of action?  The question of whether 
federal courts should remain in their Article III box and permit persons 
to enjoy rights enforceable in perpetuity until Congress is motivated to 
enact a statute of limitations or whether courts should on their own 
impose a limitations period naturally raises a separation-of-powers
question.
The two separation-of-powers theories that have emerged in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence—formalism and functionalism—are useful guides 
for understanding the judiciary’s role in ascertaining Congress’s intent in
the statute of limitations context.102 For a formalist, governmental
functions should be strictly separated so that the powers of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches are clearly demarcated.103 A 
violation of the separation of powers occurs whenever actors within one 
branch of government step out of their narrowly defined category and
carry out functions reserved for another branch of government.104 It 
comes as no surprise that the formalist theory of separation of powers is
the theoretical justification for the familiar plain-meaning method of 
statutory construction, which holds that if a statute on its face is
unambiguous, courts should look no further than the plain language of
that statute to divine Congress’s intent.105 By limiting courts to 
interpreting the words on the face of a statute, courts are essentially
stripped of any power to legislate by adding to or subtracting from the 
statute under review.  For a formalist, then, Congress’s failure to 
prescribe a statute of limitations means that Congress intended that no 
limitations period applies.  An Article III court, according to the 
formalist, should simply not enter the business of making policy
judgments about the time limitations applicable to suits that seek to 
vindicate legislatively created rights. 
The functionalist approach to separation of powers operates 
102. See generally Keith Werhan, Essay, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 
TUL. L. REV. 2681, 2681-83 (1996) (stating that the Court has followed formalist and 
functionalist conceptions of separation of powers). 
103. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 951 (1983). 
104. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955-56. 
105. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989); Busic v. United
States, 446 U.S. 398, 405 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 
(1974); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68 (1810). 
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differently. The functionalist focuses less on rigid categories of
governmental functions and more on the pragmatic, real-world problem 
of efficient government operation.106 For the functionalist, separation of
powers must be flexible, adaptable, and responsive to the needs of a 
constantly changing, fluid democratic political system.107 Functionalism
sanctions “innovative action” when such action is necessary to strike the 
appropriate balance among the branches of government or when doing
so prevents one branch from interfering with another branch’s 
“constitutionally assigned functions.”108 As such, the functionalist
approach to statutory construction is less strict than the formalist one,
taking a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to ascertaining 
legislative intent.109 In the statute of limitations context, the functionalist
will not only look past the language of the statute and into the legislative 
history, but may also consider the effects a no-limitations rule may have 
on defendants and courts. Compared to the formalist, then, the 
functionalist is more likely to take “innovative action” and supply a 
limitations period if doing so comports—or, at least, does not interfere— 
with some legislative policy objective and at the same time promotes a
more efficiently functioning government. 
Although the formalist and the functionalist offer two competing 
conceptions of an appropriate separation of powers, they may be fused
together to form what Professor Werhan has described as a “separation 
norm.”110 At its core, the norm locates the separation-of-powers doctrine
in the process by which the government affects individual rights.  That is 
to say, the separation norm recognizes that no one branch of government 
should have the power unilaterally to control individual liberty.111 
Before liberty is restricted, the separation norm requires consensus
among each branch of government, so that diverse perspectives inform
106. See Werhan, supra note 102, at 2685. 
107. See id. 
108. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
109. Judge Learned Hand perhaps best captured the functionalist approach to
statutory construction when he wrote: 
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of
any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else.  But it is one of the 
surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress 
out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose 
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the 
surest guide to their meaning. 
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 
110. Werhan, supra note 102, at 2687-91. 
111. See id. at 2689-90. 
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and legitimize the government action taken.112 A deviation from this
process of deliberation does not, as a formalist may suggest, ipso facto
render government action unconstitutional.  Rather, this norm allows the 
acting branch to make a showing that the deviation is necessary to 
vindicate some overriding government objective.113 
The separation norm accounts for the respective strengths and 
weaknesses in formalist and functionalist conceptions of the separation 
of powers, providing a separation-of-powers doctrinal base that neither
theory standing alone can provide.  The norm endorses the formalist’s 
view that departures from a strict separation of powers are suspect, and,
at the same time, recognizes that “[t]here must be some functional 
accounting of a governmental departure from the separation norm and
some judicial openness to the need for innovation in special
circumstances.”114 But the separation norm does not adopt—lock, stock,
and barrel—the functionalist desire to innovate.  Rather, the norm 
“approaches the functional inquiry with a normative stance that is 
skeptical of the deviation.”115 
The separation norm translates quite nicely in the statute of limitations 
context. Statutes of limitations operate to extinguish nondiligent 
persons’ rights, so that the legitimacy (in a separation-of-powers sense) 
of a chosen limitations period depends upon the process by which the 
particular time period was chosen.  The legitimacy of a statute of 
limitations is at its apex when Congress prescribes a limitations period, 
for inherent in the give-and-take of politics lies the deliberative process
contemplated by the separation norm. At the same time, however, if the
legislative branch fails to prescribe a limitations period, that failure may
operate to the detriment of the judicial branch, which may be required to
adjudicate stale claims or otherwise abandon any realistic attempt to
fulfill its truth-seeking function.116 Likewise, permitting plaintiffs to
enjoy rights enforceable in perpetuity deprives defendants of the benefits
112. See id. at 2690-91. 
113. See id. at 2691. 
114. Id. 
115. Werhan, supra note 102, at 2691. 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); United States v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956); Gould v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
905 F.2d 738, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); see also Donna A. Boswell, Comment,
The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal 
Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447, 1464 (1988) (“[S]tatutes of limitation are by
now rather uniformly recognized as a useful mechanism for reducing court dockets.”). 
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of repose. Viewed in this way, the separation norm would permit the 
judiciary some leeway in protecting itself and defendants from having to
adjudicate or defend stale legal claims.
C. The Borrowing Principle
What rule of statutory construction would the separation norm support
when Congress does not provide a statute of limitations for a federally 
created right?  This question was answered long ago.  Statutes of 
limitations are so widely accepted, the principle of repose so revered,
and the truth-seeking function of Article III courts so important that, in
an uninterrupted line of cases dating back to 1830, the Supreme Court
has held that if federal statutes that confer federal rights on civil litigants 
are silent on the limitations question, courts should borrow from and
apply analogous state or federal statutes of limitations.117  Indeed, 
because the policies promoted by statutes of limitations have been a
fixture in American jurisprudence since the earliest days of this 
Republic, federal courts have been in the business of “interstitial
lawmaking” for a long time now, developing that rare bird of modern 
jurisprudence, the federal common law.118 
117. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-37 (1995); Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355-58 (1991); Reed v. United 
Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-25 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 
(1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,  483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987);
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 266-67 & n.12 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
240-41 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1984); Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
462 U.S. 650, 656-57 (1983); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151, 158-63 (1983); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 (1981); Board
of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 
404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-05 (1966);
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224-26 (1958); Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1945); Herget v. Central Nat’l Bank & Trust
Co., 324 U.S. 4, 6-9 (1945); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 97-98 (1941); Board of 
County Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1939); O’Sullivan v. Felix, 
233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 
U.S. 390, 397 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); McDonald v. 
Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 72 (1902); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 158 (1899); Campbell 
v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 613-20 (1895); Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
599, 603 (1862); M’Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830). 
118. See William Wirt Blume & B.J. George, Jr., Limitations and the Federal 
Courts, 49 MICH. L. REV. 937, 939-40 (1951); Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Time Bars in
Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of 
Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1012-13 (1980); Paul J. Mishkin, The
Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National 
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957); Boswell, supra note 
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The practice of filling the interstices of federal law has important
consequences for judicial inquiry into congressional intent in the statute 
of limitations context.  Even though, as Judge Kozinski has noted in a 
different context, “interpreting the sounds of silence is a euphemism for 
rewriting,”119  the Supreme Court has said that, as a matter of statutory 
construction, it is simply incorrect to assume, in the face of
congressional silence on the limitations issue, that Congress intends to
confer rights enforceable in perpetuity.120  Rather, the Court has held that
Congress’s awareness of the practice of borrowing statutes of limitations 
permits courts to “assume that Congress intends by its silence that
[courts] borrow state[-]law [statutes of limitations].”121 Even Justice 
Scalia, the modern-day godfather of strict constructionism, does not 
believe that congressional silence on the statute of limitations question 
means that Congress intends that no limitations period applies, at least if
an applicable state-law limitations period is available.122 
Although the Supreme Court has held that state rather than federal law 
should be the “lender of first resort,”123 the Court has not limited its
borrowing to state law alone.  Courts may also borrow a statute of 
limitations from some other, more analogous federal statute.124 
116, at 1451-74. 
119. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting).
120. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988). 
121. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987).
At least one commentator has suggested that congressional silence on the limitations 
issue should not automatically trigger state-law borrowing.  See Ellen E. Kaulbach, 
Comment, A Functional Approach to Borrowing Limitations Periods for Federal 
Statutes, 77 CAL. L. REV. 133, 155-57 (1989).  Rather, courts should look to federal law 
and borrow federal limitations periods that promote federal policies.  Id. at 157, 159-69. 
122. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 164-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).  To be sure, Justice Scalia has quite a different view about the operation of
the borrowing principle. He has argued that once a court concludes that no state statute 
of limitations should be borrowed, courts should not look to federal statutes of
limitations, but rather should conclude that no limitations period applies at all.  See id. at 
170. In this way, Congress would be prompted “to enact a limitations period that it 
believes ‘appropriate,’ a judgment far more within its competence than ours.”  Id. This,
of course, is not the view of a clear majority of the presently-constituted Supreme Court. 
See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-37 (1995) (holding that borrowing 
from analogous federal statutes of limitations is appropriate under certain 
circumstances).
123. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34. 
124. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72
(1983); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 301
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A limitations period is almost indispensable to a 
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According to the Court, there are two criteria that must be satisfied
before courts should eschew a state-law limitations period in favor of a 
federal one. First, the federal statute must provide a “‘closer analogy’” 
to the federal law at issue than available state statutes.125  Second, courts
will borrow from analogous federal statutes if “the federal policies at 
stake and the practicalities of litigation make that [federal] rule a 
significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking” than
state law.126 In other words, if applying state law would be “at odds with
the purpose or operation of federal substantive law” or would “frustrate 
or interfere with the implementation of national policies,”127 the
Supreme Court has applied the common-sense notion that “Congress 
would not wish courts to apply a limitations period that would only 
stymie the policies underlying the federal cause of action.”128 
Article III courts do not, however, blindly apply the borrowing 
principle and abandon any search for legislative intent in the face of
congressional silence on the limitations issue.  Rather, in keeping with a 
generally held duty to divine congressional intent, courts refrain from 
borrowing a state or federal statute of limitations if Congress has either
stated explicitly in the legislative history that no limitations period 
should apply or if a legislative policy objective is furthered by not
imposing a limitations period on a federal cause of action.129 
Of course, the borrowing principle is not without its critics.  Attacks 
have come on essentially two fronts.  First, the borrowing principle is
seen as inconsistent with a proper conception of the separation of 
powers, for the act of borrowing a statute of limitations permits Article 
III courts to assume policymaking functions traditionally reserved for 
the legislative branch.130 Second, called on one instance a “tottering
parapet of a ramshackle edifice,”131 the borrowing principle is 
scheme of civil liability; even when federal law prescribes no express statute of
limitations, we will not ordinarily assume that Congress intended no time limit.” (citing 
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158)). 
125. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 148 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-
72).
126. Id. 
127. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 
U.S. 355, 367 (1977)). 
128. North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34.  See generally United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 600-01 (1973) (“Our Federal Union is a complicated
organism, but its legal processes cannot legitimately be simplified through the inviting
expedient of special legislation which has the effect of confiscating interests of the
United States.”).
129. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985);
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 356. 
130. See, e.g., Tellis v. USF&G, 805 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting).
131. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
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admittedly indeterminate in its application, sometimes producing 
inconsistent and unprincipled results.132 These criticisms, however, have
had little impact on courts’ application of the borrowing principle.133 
Although the borrowing principle has been the subject of much
commentary,134 no commentator has offered a separation-of-powers 
defense of the principle.  The borrowing principle strikes a balance
943 (1987), but overruled by Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir.
1990).
132. See McCartney C. v. Herrin Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 F.3d 173,
174-75 (7th Cir. 1994); Lowenthal et al., supra note 118, at 1013. 
133. To be sure, Congress has provided a limited response.  In 1990, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which establishes a default, four-year statute of limitations for 
civil statutes passed after December 1, 1990 that do not contain a limitations provision. 
The provision states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under
an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be 
commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”  28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 
(West 1994). The statute has been criticized for not going far enough, for “it will be 
many years, if not decades, before any such assortment of future-created claims can 
match the quantum of those already on the books.”  David D. Siegel, Practice 
Commentary, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658, at 240 (West 1994). 
134. See, e.g., Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 
Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1989); Katharine F. 
Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72 
NEB. L. REV. 454 (1993); Kimberly Jade Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation
Period with Real Limitations, 69 IND. L.J. 477 (1994); David D. Siegel, The Statute of
Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New “General” One in Federal Question 
Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations
Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683; Michael B. Brennan, Note, Okure v. Owens:
Choosing Among Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 1306 (1988); Edwin Scott Hackenberg, Comment, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual 
of Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1411 (1988); Carole Novak Harrod, Comment, Judicial Gap-Filling in WARN 
Claims: The Uncertainty Continues, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1125 (1995); Cathy H. Herndon & 
Monroe Hill, Jr., Note, In re Data Access Systems Security Litigation: Finally, a Step 
Towards Uniformity in 10b-5 Statute of Limitations Disputes, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1045
(1989); Peter J. Mignone, Note, What Statute of Limitations Should Apply to the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1419 (1995); Charles 
Benjamin Nutley, Comment, Triggering One-Year Limitations on Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 Actions: Actual or Inquiry Discovery?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1993);
Paul Rathburn, Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983: More 
Than “A Half Measure of Uniformity”, 73 MINN. L. REV. 85 (1988); Cynthia Reed, 
Note, Time Limits for Federal Employees Under Title VII: Jurisdictional Prerequisites or 
Statutes of Limitation?, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1371 (1990); David Reisman, Comment, The 
Move Toward Uniformity: The Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 51 LA. L. REV. 667 
(1991); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68
(1953); John A. Ray, Recent Development, Statute of Limitations for Employee Actions 
under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 323 (1994). 
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between formalist and functionalist conceptions of the separation of 
powers consistent with the separation norm, accounting for both 
formalist and functionalist concerns.  The practice of borrowing state
statutes of limitations should pose no separation-of-powers problem for 
the formalist because courts have often derived their authority to borrow 
state law from the Rules Decision Act of 1789, which permits Article III
courts to apply state law to fill gaps left in federal law.135 Plainly, there
can be no violation of a strict separation of powers where Congress has 
explicitly conferred on Article III courts the power to choose an
appropriate state-law limitations period in the face of congressional
silence. And even if, as the Supreme Court and some commentators
have suggested,136 the Rules Decision Act does not provide courts the
statutory authority to borrow state limitations periods, Congress’s failure 
to prescribe limitations periods for the rights it creates suggests that 
Congress has left it to Article III courts to fill statute of limitations gaps 
in federal law.137 An Article III court surely does not usurp the
separation of powers by doing that which Congress expects it to do. 
With respect to borrowing a federal statute of limitations, the formalist
should have no objection.  As I have suggested, Congress expects courts 
to borrow statutes of limitations in the face of congressional silence on
the limitations issue.  Courts will borrow a federal limitations period 
only where application of state law would undermine or frustrate federal 
policies. Viewed in this way, Article III courts cannot logically run 
afoul of the separation norm by vindicating federal policy objectives— 
which are normally the product of the deliberative process contemplated 
by the separation norm—through borrowing a federal, rather than state, 
statute of limitations. Indeed, rather than interfere with Congress’s 
prerogative to establish federal policy, Article III courts protect those
policies from unwarranted intrusion by the States.
At the same time, the borrowing principle represents that kind of 
“innovative action” dear to the heart of the functionalist.  The practice of 
borrowing is driven by the quintessentially pragmatic goal of ensuring 
that courts do not have to adjudicate legal claims in a manner that 
compromises a court’s ability to discharge its Article III functions.  The 
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (“The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.”); see also Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 652 
(1893).
136. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13; Lowenthal et al., supra note 118, 
at 1024-42; Nelson, supra note 134, at 469. 
137. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987); Lowenthal et al., supra note 118, at 1013-14; Nelson, supra note 134, at 469-70. 
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principle therefore rejects the formalist presumption that congressional 
silence on the limitations issue represents a congressional command not
to impose a limitations period on a federal cause of action.  Consistent 
with the functionalist method of statutory construction, the borrowing
principle endorses a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to divining 
congressional intent. Courts may assume that congressional silence 
triggers state or federal borrowing, yet courts must still search the 
legislative history for any indication that Congress intended that no 
limitations period applies.  The exceptions to the borrowing principle 
preclude unjustified judicial encroachments into the legislative arena by
ensuring that Article III courts respect the separation norm’s core notion 
that consensus between the branches of government legitimize 
restrictions on individual rights.  Only when a court concludes that 
Congress’s silence is “pure” does that court resort to borrowing.  And 
courts are prohibited from engaging in a “bald . . . form of judicial 
innovation,” in which the judiciary constructs from whole cloth its own 
limitations period, one not borrowed from a state or federal statute of
limitations and one cut loose from the deliberative process that bestows
legitimacy upon limitations periods.138 
In addition to striking a proper balance between formalist and 
functionalist theories of the separation of powers, the borrowing 
principle also serves as a useful tool in the context of congressional
waivers of sovereign immunity.  It is well settled that Congress must
clearly intend to waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, and that 
courts are not permitted to extend that waiver beyond what Congress 
intended.139 In the statute of limitations context, congressional silence
obviously cannot amount to a clear waiver, so that some limitations 
period must apply.  The borrowing principle protects courts from 
erroneously extending the waiver by providing a methodological bridge 
to a limitations period. 
138. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966); see id. at 701-05 
(refusing to create a limitations period wholly separate from federal or state statutes of 
limitations, and instead borrowing from state law); see also Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg.
Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The difficulty with 
creating a statute of limitations ex nihilo lies in the fact that judge-made rules come in 
the first instance from the bottom of the judicial hierarchy, rather than being imposed
from on high.”).
139. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34-35, 37 (1992); see 
also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (holding that waivers of sovereign
immunity by Congress “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”).
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From a normative stance, the fallout from borrowing state or federal
statutes of limitations remains somewhat troublesome.  The non-uniform 
application of statutes of limitations to the same federal cause of action 
creates uncertainty harmful to plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.  There 
are few more important issues facing a plaintiff than the time within
which she must file a suit to vindicate federally created rights, for failure
to comply with the limitations requirement extinguishes a plaintiff’s 
claim forever.  A definite, uniform limitations period eliminates the 
potential that plaintiffs will lose their rights to an after-the-fact
application of the borrowing principle.  Defendants, too, may be harmed
by the practice of borrowing.  The right to repose is rendered hollow if 
limitations periods vary so widely that defendants cannot efficiently
order their affairs because of uncertain liability exposure.  And courts, 
set adrift on a sea of limitless possibilities, must devote an inordinate 
amount of their resources to deciphering which statute of limitations to 
apply.140 
From a practical standpoint, however, the problems of indeterminacy 
and nonuniformity have not troubled courts all that much, for they have 
(perhaps while holding their judicial noses) routinely applied the 
borrowing principle.  The Supreme Court, for one, has applied the 
principle to a number of federal statutes.141 Lower federal courts have
also joined the fray, applying the borrowing principle to the Individuals 
140. Judge Ripple of the Seventh Circuit perhaps captured this sentiment best when 
he said, 
Several centuries from now, when the archeologists have unearthed a copy of
the Federal Reporter and turned it over to the legal historians for study and
analysis, our descendants will indeed be puzzled to discover that a society in
which judicial resources were such a scarce “commodity” expended so much 
of that “commodity” searching its state codes for “analogous” limitation
periods. I doubt very much that, at least in this regard, our priorities will
command much admiration. 
Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting).  As we shall later see, however, these criticisms are at their 
perigee in the context of the statute of limitations problem posed by deemed denials. See 
infra notes 192-194 and accompanying text. 
141. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 147-57 (civil RICO; federal 
statute applicable); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; state 
statutes applicable); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-72 (Labor Management Relations Act;
federal statute applicable); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 
(1975) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); state statute applicable); Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 102-05 (1971) (Lands Act; state statute applicable); Cope 
v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (National Bank Act; state statute applicable); 
O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1870; state statute 
applicable); Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397
(1906) (Sherman Act; state statute applicable); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610,
613-18 (1895) (Patent Act; state statute applicable). 
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with Disabilities Education Act,142 the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”),143 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,144 and a number of other federal statutes.145 
IV. THE BORROWING PRINCIPLE AND THE DEEMED-DENIAL PROBLEM
Is the borrowing principle the key that unlocks the statute of 
limitations problem posed by the deemed-denial option of the FTCA?
When Congress amended the FTCA in 1966 and failed to prescribe a 
limitations period for deemed denials, did Congress intend not to impose 
any limitations period on deemed-denial lawsuits?  Or can Congress’s 
omission rather be construed as “pure” silence on the limitations issue,
thereby triggering the borrowing principle? 
No court or commentator has addressed the question of whether the
borrowing principle should apply to the deemed-denial provision of the 
FTCA. Commentators have focused their attention elsewhere.146 Courts
have ignored this application of the principle altogether—even though 
they have held that § 2401(b) is silent on the limitations period
applicable to deemed denials147—and the Justice Department has not
pursued this line of argument. Accordingly, the threshold question is 
whether the Supreme Court’s borrowing jurisprudence should be applied 
to the administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA.  The answer is
yes. 
Because the FTCA confers on plaintiffs a cause of action against the
United States,148 and because § 2675(a) provides FTCA claimants with a 
jurisdictional ticket to federal district court, the borrowing principle may
142. See, e.g., Zipperer ex rel. Zipperer v. School Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 850-52 (11th
Cir. 1997) (borrowing state law); Providence Sch. Dep’t v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (same). 
143. See Schroeder v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 970 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(borrowing state law); Jenkins v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 
F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1983) (same). 
144. See Begay v. Hodel, 730 F. Supp. 1001, 1010-11 (D. Ariz. 1990) (recognizing 
that state law should be borrowed, but declining to choose which limitations period
applied because such a choice was not necessary to the disposition of the case).
145. See supra note 134 (authorities cited therein). 
146. See supra note 133 (authorities cited therein). 
147. See Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1013-15 (9th Cir. 1998); Pascale 
v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1993); Parker v. United States, 935 F.2d 
176, 177 (9th  Cir. 1991); Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 701 F. Supp. 386, 389 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, 2675(a) (1994). 
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be applied to the deemed denial problem.  Whether the principle should
be applied to the deeming option presents a closer question.  Although 
the borrowing principle has been applied to other exhaustion schemes,149 
what makes the deemed-denial question odd is that, unlike many statutes 
subjected to the borrowing principle (in which no limitations period is 
specified at all for the cause of action), the FTCA does contain a statute
of limitations—§ 2401(b).150 The problem, of course, is that § 2401(b)
does not mention deemed denials.  Accordingly, whether a statute of 
limitations should in fact be borrowed depends upon whether Congress’s
silence is “pure.”  The next section examines this critical issue.




1. The Borrowing Principle Applies to the Deemed-Denial Problem 
There is nothing to borrow if Congress has spoken on the limitations 
issue.151 Ordinarily, determining whether Congress is silent on the
limitations question is obvious on the face of the statute—Congress 
creates a federal cause of action, but neglects to enact a statute of 
limitations.  The FTCA is different in this respect because, as I have
pointed out, it contains a statute of limitations that omits deemed denials 
and an exhaustion provision which provides a time period within which
the deeming option may be exercised.  Accordingly, a determination of 
whether Congress was silent with respect to deemed denials requires an
examination of both provisions.  In particular, courts may look to §
2675(a), which specifies a time limit for exhausting FTCA 
administrative remedies, or to § 2401(b), which is the statute of
limitations provision of the FTCA. 
Section 2675(a) permits FTCA claimants to deem a claim denied “any
149. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-72
(1983) (Labor Management Relations Act; borrowing federal law); Providence Sch. 
Dep’t v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1997) (Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act; borrowing state law). 
150. Although the FTCA does contain a statute of limitations, that fact alone should
not preclude the application of the borrowing principle, for ERISA too contains a statute 
of limitations that applies only to one of many causes of action available to ERISA 
plaintiffs. See Norwood, supra note 134, at 488-91.  Yet, in the ERISA context, courts 
have borrowed (largely from state law) a statute of limitations for those federally created 
causes of action not subject to the statute of limitations Congress explicitly prescribed
for the ERISA remedial scheme.  See id. 
151. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 n.20; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 
U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977); Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1883). 
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time” after the six-month settlement period expires.152 One may argue
that an FTCA claimant may deem a claim denied by filing suit, Congress
anticipated that most administrative claims would be deemed denied in
this manner, and, therefore, because that suit may be filed “any time”
after the six-month settlement period, Congress was not silent on the
limitations issue.  Section 2675(a), the argument would conclude, 
provides no time limit within which to file a suit coming on the heels of
a deemed denial.153 The argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
Section 2675(a) is the exhaustion provision of the FTCA and logically 
cannot prescribe a limitations period for lawsuits filed after FTCA 
administrative remedies have been exhausted. Under exhaustion 
schemes like the FTCA, a limitations period does not begin to run until 
administrative remedies have been exhausted, that is, when there has 
been a final denial of the claim.154 To suggest that the “any time
thereafter” language in § 2675(a) is the limitations provision for deemed
denials is to endorse the untenable position that a deemed denier 
exhausts her administrative remedies six months and one day after she 
presents her claim to an agency and the agency has failed to adjudicate 
the claim.  Not only is this construction of the FTCA inconsistent with
the plain language of § 2675(a)—which permits claimants to exhaust 
administrative remedies “any time” after the six-month settlement
period—it is also irreconcilable with the legislative history, which
suggests that the “any time thereafter” provision was designed to provide
agencies and claimants time to resolve difficult tort claims not
susceptible to settlement within six months.155 A federal agency retains
jurisdiction over a claim until there has been a formal or deemed denial 
of the claim.  Prior to exhaustion, then, the claim is still open and subject
to review by the agency. 
A contrary conclusion also places undue emphasis on the manner in
which an administrative claim is deemed denied.  Although § 2675(a) on
its face does not state explicitly how an FTCA claimant may deem her 
claim denied, it is clear that a claimant may either inform the agency that 
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
153. See Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 701 F. Supp. 386, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (holding that § 2675(a) prescribes a limitations period for deemed denials). 
154. See supra Part I. A. & B.
155. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; Hearings, supra note 22, at 13 
(statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General); see also Mack v. United 
States Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
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she deems her claim denied or file a lawsuit.156 So, for example, if the
FTCA claimant provides the agency with written notice that she is 
deeming her claim denied, the “any time thereafter” language of § 
2675(a) plainly does not operate as a statute of limitations.  Rather, such
written notice is the functional equivalent—from an administrative-
exhaustion standpoint—of a formal, written denial from the agency,
illustrating that the FTCA claimant has concluded that her administrative
remedies have been exhausted. 
The state-law scheme after which Congress patterned the 1966 
amendments confirms this interpretation of the deemed-denial option of
the FTCA. When Congress amended the FTCA in 1966, it looked to
Iowa’s administrative-exhaustion scheme, noting that Iowa’s system of
adjudicating tort claims brought against government entities “provide[s] 
requirements very similar to those provided in [the amendments to the 
FTCA].”157 Under Iowa law, a tort claimant must present her tort claim
to an appeals board and, as with the FTCA, wait six months for the 
board to settle or deny the claim.158 If six months passes and the board
does not act on the claim, a claimant is expressly given the option to 
withdraw her claim and file suit in an Iowa court.159 The Iowa Supreme
Court, however, has not read the withdrawal provision as requiring
written notice (i.e., a letter) to the agency of her withdrawal decision. 
Instead, the court has held that filing a lawsuit is the functional 
equivalent of notifying an agency in writing of the decision to withdraw 
a claim.160 The Iowa cases therefore demonstrate that, for purposes of 
administrative exhaustion, the means by which a claimant deems a claim 
156. See Pitard, supra note 6, at 904 (stating that the deemed-denial option in § 
2675(a) permits FTCA claimants to provide written notice to the agency or to file a 
lawsuit). Nothing in the text of § 2675(a) requires an FTCA claimant to inform the 
agency in writing of her decision to deem a claim denied.  Nonetheless, § 2675(a) is 
essentially a notice provision, so that, short of filing a lawsuit, an FTCA claimant must,
at the very least, communicate her deemed-denial decision to the agency. See, e.g., 
Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the notice-based
character of a formal denial).
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 7; see also S. REP. NO. 1327, supra
note 21, at 4.  The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized the symmetry between the FTCA 
and Iowa’s tort claims act.  See Bloomquist v. Wapello County, 500 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 
1993) (stating that Iowa’s tort claims act is similar to the FTCA); Feltes v. State, 385
N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 1986) (same).  See generally Don R. Bennett, Handling Tort
Claims and Suits Against the State of Iowa: Part I, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 189 (1968)
(reviewing the contours of Iowa’s tort claims act).
158. See IOWA CODE § 25A.5 (1993), recodified at IOWA CODE § 669.5 (1997).
159. See id.
160. See Bensley v. State, 468 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa 1991); see also Clites v.
State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (“Service of notice of plaintiffs’ suit
constituted notice of withdrawal and substantially complied with the requirements of 
section 25A.5.”).
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denied is immaterial, or as the Iowa Supreme Court put it, a mere
“formality . . . prior to filing suit.”161 
Applying this reasoning in the FTCA context, when an FTCA 
claimant deems a claim denied, she is notifying the federal agency that
she is deeming her claim finally denied for purposes of administrative 
exhaustion. It is irrelevant whether that notification is in the form of 
written notice to the agency or the filing of a lawsuit.  That the deemed-
denial option can be exercised in different ways does not, therefore,
deprive the deeming option of its administrative-exhaustion character.162 
That leaves § 2401(b), and it is there that the question of whether 
Congress was silent is solved. Section 2401(b) imposes a six-month
limitations period only on formal, written denials properly mailed to
FTCA claimants.163  Section 2401(b) says nothing about deemed denials.
Accordingly, Congress’s failure to impose a limitations period on 
deemed denials reflects congressional silence on the matter.  Through 
that silence, the borrowing principle must be triggered because, as the
161. Bensley, 468 N.W.2d at 446. 
162. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Arigo v. United States, 980 F.2d 1159 (8th
Cir. 1992), construed the deeming option in an unjustifiably restrictive manner.  In 
Arigo, after the six-month no-suit period expired, the plaintiff informed the agency in 
writing that he was withdrawing his claim from agency consideration and planning to
file suit in federal district court. Id. at 1160. The plaintiff then filed suit eight months 
after the date of the letter.  Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded, correctly, that the 
plaintiff’s claim was time-barred pursuant to the six-month limitations period in §
2401(b) because “[t]o hold otherwise would effectively give [the plaintiff] unilateral 
power to toll § 2401(b)’s six-month limitations period.”  Id. at 1161. In dictum, 
however, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, if the plaintiff had not “withdrawn” his claim 
and simply provided the agency with a written-notice deemed denial (and not used the
word “withdraw”), the six-month limitations period would not be triggered because
the letter would do nothing more than recognize [the plaintiff’s] administrative
remedies were exhausted under § 2675(a).  To treat this kind of statement as a 
formal agency denial overlooks the fact that the agency can still consider the 
claim and trigger § 2401(b)’s six-month limitations period by denying the 
claim.
Id. The dictum in Arigo represents an incorrect reading of the FTCA’s deeming option
because it places significant weight on the way in which an FTCA claimant exercises the
deeming option.  Whether the plaintiff used the magic word “withdraw” or not is 
immaterial.  Indeed, just as a written-notice deemed denial satisfies the exhaustion
requirement of § 2675(a), so too does a withdrawal.  This interpretation of the deemed-
denial option is in keeping with Congress’s explicit statement in the legislative history
that the 1966 changes to § 2675(a) “in effect” replace the pre-1966 option to withdraw a 
claim from an agency. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The Arigo court 
provided no authority for the proposition that the FTCA discriminates among methods of
deeming a claim denied in the manner suggested by the court. 
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). 
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Supreme Court has said, congressional silence on the limitations 
question means that Congress intended that a state or federal limitations 
period should be borrowed and applied.164 
It could be argued that because the language in § 2401(b) about formal 
written denials tracks quite closely the formal-denial language in §
2675(a) and because Congress amended § 2401(b) and § 2675(a) in the 
same bill, it follows that, by negative inference, Congress intended that
no limitations period should apply to deemed denials.165 This argument,
however, fails for at least three reasons.  First, just because the FTCA
imposes a time limitation upon one form of exhaustion and not upon 
another is no reason to reject the notion that Congress was silent on the 
limitations question.  The Supreme Court and lower courts have 
borrowed and applied a statute of limitations where a limitations period
was prescribed for one part of a statute but not another.166 Second, and
perhaps most importantly, because the FTCA represents a congressional 
waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, that waiver must be
unequivocally expressed and must be strictly construed.167 Thus, to say,
by drawing a negative inference, that Congress intended not to impose a 
limitations period on deemed denials is to endorse the notion that 
Congress implicitly waived the United States’ sovereign immunity. 
There can be no implicit waiver of sovereign immunity.168 Third, that the
language in § 2401(b) and § 2675(a) is identical proves, rather than
disproves, that Congress was silent on the limitations period applicable 
to deemed denials.  Because Congress provided two mutually exclusive 
methods of administrative exhaustion and because it did not account for
deemed denials in § 2401(b), it follows that Congress had nothing to say 
about the applicability of a limitations period to deemed denials. 
Accordingly, at the risk of appearing pedantic, not to say anything about
something is to remain silent. 
2. Application of the Borrowing Principle to the     
164. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147
(1987).
165. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2064 & n.4 (1997) (applying this 
principle of statutory construction to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act);
Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the principle to 
the deemed-denial problem presented by the FTCA). 
166. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966) (Labor
Management Relations Act; six-month limitations period for provision governing unfair 
labor practice proceedings, but no limitations period for suits challenging collective 
bargaining contracts); see also supra note 150 (discussing this problem in the ERISA 
context). 
167. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). 
168. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. King, 
395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 592 (1941). 
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Deemed-Denial Problem 
Although state law is the “lender of first resort,”169 and although 
borrowing from federal law is considered “rare” and “unusual,”170 there
are situations in which a federal statute of limitations must be borrowed. 
In particular, when the application of state law would undermine federal 
policy and a federal statute provides a closer analogy, borrowing from 
and applying a federal statute of limitations is appropriate.171 The
deemed-denial limitations problem satisfies each of these requirements.
First, applying a state statute of limitations to deemed denials clearly
undermines the well-established policy that Congress, and not the States,
determines the extent of the United States’ waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  To be sure, Congress has permitted the States to control the 
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in certain limited contexts, 
so that the characterization of a tort claim filed against the United States
would be governed by state law.172 However, that an FTCA cause of 
action is governed by state law does not mean that a state-law limitations 
period should be borrowed. Because the statute of limitations applicable 
to FTCA actions is intimately connected to Congress’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity,173 there is a clear federal policy of having 
Congress, and not the States, determine the extent of the United States’
sovereign immunity with regard to statute of limitations questions.  As 
one court has noted, “Section 2401(b) represents a deliberate balance 
struck by Congress whereby a limited waiver of sovereign immunity is 
conditioned upon the prompt presentation of tort claims against the 
government.”174 It must follow that application of state limitations
periods to deemed denials would cede to the States the power to waive
the United States’ sovereign immunity on the limitations issue.  This 
169. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995). 
170. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); International 
Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 
662 (6th Cir. 1997). 
171. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147-48 
(1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983). 
172. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1994); Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 11-14 (1962); Nelson, supra note 134, at 470 n.91. 
173. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979). 
174. Gould v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 
(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); accord Hart v. Department of Labor, 116 F.3d 1338, 1341
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th
Cir. 1991)).
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clearly “frustrate[s and] significantly interfere[s] with federal policies” 
and provides a “compelling [argument] that ‘the federal policies at stake’ 
in [FTCA] actions make a federal limitations period ‘a significantly 
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.’”175 
The Supreme Court has touched on the relationship between state law 
and the FTCA, albeit in a different context. In Richards v. United
States, the Court was faced with, among other things, the question of 
whether the whole law of a state applies to claims brought under the 
FTCA.176  The Court answered the question in the affirmative.177 In 
reaching that conclusion, the Court made certain observations that are
relevant to how the borrowing principle may operate in the statute of 
limitations/deemed-denial context.  In particular, the Court stated: 
We should not assume that Congress intended to set the courts completely adrift
from state law with regard to questions for which it has not provided a specific
and definite answer in an act such as the one before us which, as we have
indicated, is so intimately related to state law.
. . . .
In the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, we do not believe that
Congress intended to adopt the inflexible rule urged upon us by petitioners [i.e., 
creating a federal common-law rule].  Despite the power of Congress to enact 
for litigation of this type a federal conflict-of-laws rule independent of the 
States’ development of such rules, we should not, particularly in the type of
interstitial legislation involved here, assume that it has done so.178 
Notably, however, the Richards Court excluded from this principle 
situations in which “Congress has been specific [in its intent that] federal
courts . . . depart completely from state law.”179 In a footnote, the Court
listed provisions of the FTCA in which Congress explicitly intended to
depart from state law, and among them is § 2401(b).180 
Accordingly, although Richards did not explicitly address the question 
of whether § 2401(b) should be borrowed and applied to deemed denials, 
the decision indicates that the statute of limitations applicable to FTCA
actions is controlled by federal law—§ 2401(b)—and courts have so
held.181 It is clear, therefore, that there is a well established federal 
175. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (quoting DelCostello, 
462 U.S. at 172). 
176. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). 
177. Id. at 11. 
178. Id. at 11, 13; see also Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992)
(“[T]he extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA is generally determined by
reference to state law.”).  See generally Mishkin, supra note 118, at 802 n.22 (referring
to the FTCA as one of the “clearest instances of federal incorporation of state law”).
179. Richards, 369 U.S. at 14. 
180. Id. at 13 n.28. 
181. See Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. United States, 932
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policy of having Congress determine the extent of the United States’
waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to the statute of limitations 
applicable to FTCA actions.  Allowing the States to control that waiver
delivers a fatal blow to this objective.182 
Second, § 2401(b) provides a more analogous federal statute of 
limitations for deemed denials than any state law can possibly provide. 
Section 2401(b) addresses the deemed denial’s exhaustion counterpart, 
the formal denial. Pursuant to § 2675(a), formal denials and deemed
denials open the jurisdictional door for FTCA claimants to bring a state-
law based cause of action, so that “all claims arising out of [§ 2675(a)]
‘should be characterized in the same way.’”183 And the only material
difference, for borrowing purposes, between formal and deemed denials 
is who does the denying, the agency or the claimant.184 This is as  
F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991); Ulrich v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 853 F.2d 1078, 1080
(2d Cir. 1988); Zeleznik v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1985); Poindexter v. United States, 647 F.2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1981); Stoleson v. United
States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980); Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933, 935
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Westfall, 197 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir. 1952); Maryland 
ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869, 871-74 (4th Cir. 1947). 
182. But see Kaulbach, supra note 121, at 168 & n.215 (“Limitations periods should 
be drawn from state law whenever Congress has explicitly required this as part of the
federal scheme.  Thus, for example, state limitations periods apply to claims under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, which contains express congressional instructions to implement
the remedies in accordance with state law.”).  Kaulbach, however, does not account for 
the limitations period set forth in § 2401(b), Richards, or the overwhelming view among 
courts that the statute of limitations applicable to FTCA lawsuits after administrative 
remedies have been exhausted is a question of federal law.
183. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987) 
(quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985)); cf., e.g., Zipperer ex rel. Zipperer
v. School Bd. of Seminole County, Fla., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997) (borrowing
from different state statute of limitations where exhaustion scheme of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act provides plaintiffs different causes of action). 
184. The practicalities of litigation coming on the heels of a formal or deemed 
denial are somewhat different.  In the formal-denial context, the FTCA claimant must
prepare for litigation once she receives the denial letter, whereas the deemed denier (in
the typical case) files suit at the same time she deems her claim denied. See, e.g., 
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 51 (1984) (holding that borrowing state administrative-
remedies statute of limitations was inappropriate because of the differences inherent in
filing an administrative claim versus bringing suit).  That difference, however, does not
compel the conclusion that a state statute of limitations ought to be borrowed and applied
to deemed denials.  First, such practical differences in litigation can be found in almost 
every comparison of two different limitation-triggering events, and nothing in Burnett
suggests that those differences alone preclude federal borrowing.  Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, that the practicalities of litigation may be different does not alter the 
fact that application of state statutes of limitations to deemed denials would 
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analogous as you can get under the cases.185 
Thus, the statute of limitations problem posed by the deeming option
of the FTCA comes within the compass of the Supreme Court’s federal-
borrowing jurisprudence.  The FTCA has created the liability so that the 
FTCA should also dictate the appropriate statute of limitations, one 
which ensures national uniformity.186 “[A] uniform statute of limitations
is required,” the Supreme Court has said, “to avoid intolerable 
‘uncertainty and time-consuming litigation,’” uncertainty which has
real-world consequences [for] both plaintiffs and defendants in [FTCA] actions. 
“Plaintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their claims, 
having wrongly postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute. 
Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with 
confidence when their delicts lie in repose.”187 
The six-month period in § 2401(b) provides uniformity, is a perfect 
analogy, and therefore should be borrowed and applied to deemed
denials.188 
The ease with which courts can solve the statute of limitations 
problem posed by deemed denials by borrowing and applying the six-
month limitations period in § 2401(b) should not be underestimated. 
Courts need not, in Chief Judge Posner’s words, “beat [their] brains out 
over the question.”189  Because it is well settled that the statute of 
limitations applicable to FTCA actions is a question of federal law and
because Congress has prescribed a six-month limitations period for 
formal denials, the problems of indeterminacy and non-uniformity
impermissibly undermine the clear policy of congressionally-authorized waivers of
sovereign immunity.  See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)
(reasoning that differences in litigation reality would not compel state-law borrowing
where doing so would undermine federal objectives). 
185. Cf., e.g., Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 149-50 (borrowing Clayton Act 
statute of limitations and applying it to RICO civil actions); DelCostello v. International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983) (borrowing § 10(b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act and applying it to the Labor Management Relations Act).
186. See, e.g., Herget v. Central Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 324 U.S. 4, 9 (1945). 
187. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 150 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272, 275 
n.34); see also Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied
rules than does the subject of periods of limitations.”). 
188. It could be argued that the six-year limitations period in § 2401(a) or the two-
year provision in § 2401(b) should be borrowed and applied to deemed denials.  The 
analogies are certainly good ones.  But they are not the best ones.  The Supreme Court
has made it clear that the “closest” federal statute of limitations should be borrowed and
applied. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995); Reed, 488 U.S. at 
323; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 146; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158.  The six-
month time limit in § 2401(b) is, for the reasons stated in Part IV.A.2, supra, the best 
choice for deemed denials.
189. McCartney C. v. Herrin Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 F.3d 173, 175 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
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simply do not arise.  The borrowing principle has been used for more
than 160 years, so that deemed deniers and the United States can hardly 
assume that § 2401(b)’s silence means that no limitations period 
applies.190 Rather, both deemed deniers and the United States should 
harbor the reasonable expectation that a limitations period is triggered
when a claimant exhausts her FTCA administrative remedies by 
deeming a claim denied.  Because § 2401(b) prescribes a six-month
limitations period for the deemed denial’s counterpart, the formal denial,
applying a uniform six-month period to deemed denials does not, by
definition, create the uncertainty that has troubled courts and 
commentators.191 Finally, rather than attempt to absorb state law or 
search federal statutes for proper analogs to the deemed-denial problem,
courts need look no further than the FTCA’s own statute of limitations 
for the proper limitations period to borrow.  A court’s job is made easier 
still because, as the next section shows, courts should not have difficulty
determining whether the exceptions to the borrowing principle apply, for 
it is clear that they do not. 
B. There’s No Escaping the Borrowing Principle 
As suggested above, the Supreme Court has identified two exceptions 
to the application of the borrowing principle.192 First, and most
obviously, if a statute is silent on its face, yet Congress has stated
explicitly in the legislative history that no limitations period should
apply, courts may not second-guess that judgment by applying the 
borrowing principle.193 Second, if not imposing a limitations period
furthers some purpose behind legislation, courts are precluded from 
undermining that purpose by resorting to the borrowing principle.194 
Neither exception applies to the statute of limitations problem posed by
deemed denials. 
190. Whether this holds true in those circuits that have concluded that no limitations
period applies to deemed denials perhaps raises an issue of retroactivity that is beyond
the scope of this Article.
191. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra Part IV.A-B. 
193. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 242-44 (1985). 
194. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358-73 (1977). 
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1. No Part of the Legislative History of the FTCA Suggests That 
Congress Intended a No-Limitations Rule for the Deeming Option 
The legislative history accompanying the 1966 amendments does not
contain an explicit statement suggesting Congress intended that no
limitations period should apply to deemed denials.  In fact, to the extent 
it can be said that Congress considered the limitations period applicable 
to deemed denials, the legislative history reveals precisely the opposite: 
Congress intended the six-month period in § 2401(b) to apply when 
claimants exercise the deeming option.  In the House and Senate Reports 
under the heading “PURPOSE,” the following statement about the 
applicable statute of limitations appears: “A claim would have to be filed
with the agency concerned within 2 years after it accrues and any tort 
action must be brought within 6 months after final denial of the
administrative claim.”195 Plainly, neither the House nor the Senate
distinguished between formal and deemed denials for purposes of the
six-month limitations period in § 2401(b).  This conclusion follows 
because both the House and Senate reports state that “any” tort action
must be filed within six months of a “final denial,” and, in § 2675(a),
Congress defined both formal and deemed denials as “final denials” for
purposes of administrative exhaustion.196 In addition, when asked about 
the statute of limitations issue, Assistant Attorney General John W. 
Douglas—the only person to testify about the meaning of the 1966
amendments to the FTCA—stated: “The statute of limitations is set out 
in the bill. It actually expands the time within which a suit could be filed
in court. At the present time there is a 2-year statute of limitations, and
this bill permits 2 years to file with the agency plus 6 months after the 
agency acts or refuses to act.”197 
The only statement in the legislative history that may support a finding 
that no statute of limitations applies to deemed denials is found in the 
section-by-section analysis of the 1966 amendments.  Both the House 
and Senate Reports state the following:
This section amends the provisions of section 2401, the limitations section, to
conform the section to the amendments added by the bill. The amendments
have the effect of simplifying the language of section 2401 to require that a 
claimant must file a claim in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within 2
years after the claim accrues, and to further require the filing of a court action
within 6 months of notice by certified or registered mail of a final decision of
 195. H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 3 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 1327, 
supra note 21, at 1 (same). 
196. See supra Part I.A.
197. Hearings, supra note 22, at 18 (emphasis added). 
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the claim by the agency to which it was presented.198 
There is no reason to think, however, that this wooden statement 
represents an explicit directive from Congress that no limitations period 
should apply to deemed denials.  First, the operative language in the
House and Senate Reports merely restates the text of § 2401(b)— 
nothing more, nothing less.  Second, the language shows that in 
“conform[ing § 2401(b)] to the amendments added by the bill,” 
Congress envisioned FTCA claimants deeming their claims denied by
filing suit sometime after the six-month settlement period expired.199  As
such, the statute of limitations issue becomes moot, and § 2401(b) was
“simplified” to reflect this fact.  In other words, there would have been
no need to include in § 2401(b) a limitations period for deemed denials 
because the act of deeming a claim denied in most cases consists of 
filing suit. 
But it is quite a different matter to conclude from the statement in the 
section-by-section analysis of § 2401(b) that Congress did not intend to 
impose a limitations period when an FTCA claimant deems her claim 
denied by providing an agency written notice of the deemed-denial
decision or when a second suit is filed after a claim is deemed denied by
filing suit.200 When Congress amended the FTCA in 1966, it was not
acting in a vacuum.  Rather, as courts have recognized, the Congress 
198. H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 5 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 1327, 
supra note 21, at 8 (same). 
199. Id.; see supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
200. Although Congress had nothing to say about the second-suit problem in the 
deemed-denial context, Congress did account for this contingency in suits brought by the 
United States. Section 2415(e), enacted in 1966, provides in part: “In the event that any
action to which this section applies is timely brought and is thereafter dismissed without 
prejudice, the action may be recommenced within one year after such dismissal, 
regardless of whether the action would otherwise then be barred by this section.”  28
U.S.C. § 2415(e) (1994).  Plainly, Congress knew how to deal with the second-suit 
problem; it did so in § 2415(e) and applied a one-year limitations period to the second
suit. Congress did not provide the United States an indefinite period within which to file
a second suit, for to do so would have obviously undermined the purpose behind the 
1966 amendments, which was to bring the United States-as-plaintiff within the compass 
of the time-honored principle of repose.  Therefore, if Congress had considered the issue,
it surely could have provided deemed deniers (and formal deniers) an extended time 
period within which to file a second suit.  Cf. Jacoby, supra note 6, at 1233 (stating that
28 U.S.C. § 2415(e) represents “a special rule . . . for government suits”).  Congress’s 
failure to do so must either mean (1) that Congress overlooked this problem as it related 
to deemed denials or (2) that Congress could not possibly have intended to provide 
deemed deniers that which it did not provide to the United States, that is, an indefinite
period within which to file a second suit. 
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legislates against a background of well settled common-law principles, 
one of which is the principle of repose, which drives the practice of
borrowing statutes of limitations and which must be incorporated into
the FTCA unless Congress instructs otherwise.201 Thus, it would be
extraordinary indeed to conclude that the 1966 Congress intended not to
impose a limitations period on deemed denials, yet failed to utter a 
single word in support of that conclusion.202 That Congress could not 
have intended a no-limitations rule for deemed deniers is reinforced
further still because, in addition to the legislative history suggesting a 
six-month limitations period applies to deemed denials,203 other clearly
201. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1992) (interpreting 
the FTCA); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 526-28 (1973) (same); Reo v. United 
States Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). 
202. See, e.g., Reo, 98 F.3d at 77 (“Given that Congress was legislating against the 
background of the ‘ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence’ requiring court 
approval of the settlement of minor’s claims, it would be surprising if the 1966
amendment [to the FTCA] took away this longstanding protection without comment.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1978))). 
203. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.  It is hard to ignore the 
legislative history accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 2415, which is the statute of limitations 
applicable to tort claims brought by the United States, for it demonstrates, perhaps more
clearly than anything else in the 1966 legislative history, Congress’s view about the 
importance of statutes of limitations.  Prior to 1966, no statute of limitations applied to 
actions brought by the United States.  H.R. REP. NO. 1534, supra note 37, at 10
(statement of Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach); Statutes of Limitations, 
supra note 84, at 1251.  Congress changed that in 1966 by enacting § 2415, which 
imposed a three-year limitations period on tort suits brought by the United States.  In
doing so, Congress intended to put the United States in the same statute of limitations 
shoes as plaintiffs who sue the government.  H.R. REP. NO. 1534, supra note 37, at 4.
Why?  The time-honored principle of repose: 
Statutes of limitation have the salutary effect of requiring litigants to institute
suits within a reasonable time of the incident or situation upon which the 
action is based. In this way the issues presented at the trial can be decided at a 
time when the necessary witnesses, documents, and other evidence are still 
available.  At the same time, the witnesses are better able to testify concerning 
the facts involved for their memories have not been dimmed by the passage of
time.  The committee feels that the prompt resolution of the matters covered by
the bill is necessary to an orderly and fair administration of justice.  Stale
claims can neither be effectively presented or adjudicated in a manner which is
fair to the parties involved.  Even if the passage of time does not prejudice the 
effective presentation of a claim, the mere preservation of records on the
assumption that they will be required to substantiate a possible claim or an 
existing claim increases the cost of keeping records.  As time passes the
collection problems invariably increase.  The Government has difficulty in 
even finding the individuals against whom it may have a claim for they may 
have died or simply disappeared.  These problems have been brought to the 
attention of the committee previously in connection with other legislation. 
This bill provides the means to resolve these difficulties.
Id. Because Congress considered § 2415 and the changes to § 2401(b) and § 
2675(a) “as a group,” id. at 3, this sentiment for the principle of repose 
reverberated throughout the legislative history.  See S. REP. NO. 1328, supra
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expressed policies underlying the 1966 amendments to the FTCA 
suggest that Congress must have intended the six-month limitations 
period in § 2401(b) to apply once an FTCA claimant takes action to 
deem her claim denied. 
2. No Conceivable Policy Objective is Furthered by Adopting a No-
Limitations Rule for Deemed-Deniers
a. The Legislative History Accompanying the 1966
Amendments to the FTCA
The second exception to application of the borrowing principle 
requires a showing that Congress’s silence promotes a congressional 
policy objective.  That is the teaching of Occidental Life Insurance Co.
v. EEOC,204 in which the Supreme Court was faced with determining 
whether a statute of limitations should be borrowed and applied to the
Title VII administrative settlement scheme, which contained no statute 
of limitations for suits brought by the EEOC.  The Court concluded that 
although Title VII was silent, the legislative history and purposes behind 
Title VII evinced a congressional intent to impose no limitations period 
at all on suits brought by the EEOC.205 
What the legislative history in Occidental plainly demonstrated was 
that Congress did not intend to impose a limitations period on the “back
end” of the administrative settlement process (i.e., when administrative 
remedies have been exhausted)—at least not with respect to suits 
brought by the EEOC.  The FTCA, of course, contains no such thing. 
Section 2401(b) plainly imposes a six-month limitations period on 
formal denials, and the legislative history accompanying the 1966 
amendments to the FTCA demonstrates clearly that Congress intended
to impose a limitations period on suits brought after FTCA claimants 
note 37, at 2; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 11-12 (same); H.R. REP. NO.
1532, supra note 21, at 11 (same).  In light of this explicit statement in the 
legislative history, one may well question the legitimacy of concluding that 
Congress highlighted the importance of repose, imposed a limitations period on
all tort suits brought by the United States and formal deniers, but at the same 
time provided deemed deniers a right enforceable in perpetuity. 
204. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). 
205. Id. at 358-73. The Supreme Court has characterized Occidental as “rare.”
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1991). 
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exhaust their administrative remedies.  Moreover, the Court in
Occidental also pointed to Congress’s goal of imposing a greater
workload on the EEOC as justification for concluding that Congress’s 
silence evinced an intent not to impose a limitations period on suits 
brought by the EEOC.206 
By contrast, an examination of the policies underlying the 1966
amendments to the FTCA207 reveals quite clearly that, by not imposing a 
limitations period on deemed denials, courts have undermined each of
Congress’s objectives and harmed each group Congress intended to 
benefit.208 At the outset, I should note that the policy objectives behind
the 1966 amendments revolved around the settlement of tort claims that 
were ordinarily resolved in an Article III court, so that when a claim is
not resolved in a federal agency and proceeds to resolution in court, 
those objectives have no relevance.  But there is no reason to so limit the 
reach of Congress’s intent when it amended the FTCA to provide a more
efficient system of adjudicating tort claims brought against the United
States. Rather, any interpretation of the FTCA should keep those policy
goals in mind, ensuring that neither claimants nor the United States seize
on the new administrative-settlement scheme and gain a litigation 
advantage in an Article III court.209 
A no-limitations rule for deemed deniers certainly does not decrease
court congestion or avoid unnecessary litigation.  Of course, Congress 
did not anticipate that every tort claim would be settled; the deemed-
denial option is proof of that.  Once in court, however, whether by way 
of a formal agency denial or a deemed denial, the six-month limitations 
period imposes on FTCA claimants a short, definite time period within 
which to file suit. The short time frame, in turn, decreases court 
congestion and avoids unnecessary litigation by weeding out suits that
206. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 369-71. 
207. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (detailing the policies promoted 
by the administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA). 
208. It should be noted that, in the FTCA context, courts routinely look to the 
legislative history to determine whether Congress has expressly and clearly waived the 
United States’ sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-
03 n.4 (1993); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1985); United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153-58 (1963); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1962);
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955); Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-32 (1953); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-
51 & nn.6-8 (1951). 
209. See, e.g., Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting 
claimant’s argument that a suit filed before the six-month settlement period expired
could proceed because doing so would undermine Congress’s purpose in decreasing 
court congestion and avoiding unnecessary litigation); Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 
284, 288-93 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting United States’ position that § 2675(a) imposed
requirements on FTCA claimant that ostensibly precluded claimant from exercising the
deeming option). 
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are not diligently prosecuted.  With regard to a lawsuit that serves as a 
deemed denial, although filing suit and deeming a claim denied often 
occur at the same time, a six-month limitations period (which, of course, 
is triggered on the day suit is filed, thus making the suit timely) 
eliminates a cost-free judicial process.  If a deemed denier does not
prosecute her suit diligently, she will not be able to file another suit 
outside of the six-month period and avoid a statute of limitations 
defense.  Thus, to the extent Congress’s administrative-exhaustion 
scheme does not produce a settlement, applying the six-month
limitations period to formal and deemed denials preserves the pre-1966 
status quo, and nothing in the legislative history suggests Congress 
intended any other result.  It is clear that not imposing a limitations 
period on deemed denials increases court congestion by permitting
FTCA claimants to repeatedly file suit over an indefinite period of
time.210 It is self-evident that this construction of the FTCA fatally 
undermines Congress’s objective of decreasing court congestion and 
avoiding unnecessary litigation. 
When an FTCA claimant deems her claim denied, application of the
six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) does not harm an FTCA 
claimant more than the Justice Department, and vice versa.  The FTCA
claimant must go through the expense of litigation, and the Justice 
Department must devote its resources to defending the claim.  By
contrast, not imposing a limitations period on deemed deniers severely 
prejudices the United States because suits can be repeatedly filed over an
indefinite period of time.  This puts the Justice Department in the 
untenable position of having to defend stale claims.  Prior to 1966, this 
would have never happened because all FTCA claimants who filed suit
were subjected to a limitations period. It is therefore wrong to suggest 
(since nothing in the legislative history supports such a conclusion) that 
despite Congress’s intent in 1966 to create a new and improved dispute-
resolution system beneficial to FTCA claimants and the United States,
Congress nonetheless intended to make the United States worse off than
it was prior to 1966. 
Finally, those who receive a formal denial are also worse off, relative
to deemed deniers, than they were prior to the 1966 amendments.  This
210. See Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
deemed deniers may deem a claim denied more than once over an indefinite period of 
time); Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 701 F. Supp. 386, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(same). 
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is so for obvious reasons. Deemed deniers would have a litigation 
advantage not enjoyed by those who see the administrative process
through and eventually obtain a formal, written denial of their claim.
Conferring such an advantage on deemed deniers, who voluntarily 
remove themselves from any continued settlement process, clearly puts 
an unwarranted onus on the settlement process for those who earnestly
want to settle their claims.  Congress surely did not intend to undercut 
the settlement scheme in this way by putting FTCA claimants on such an
unequal footing in federal district court, for there is no evidence in the 
legislative history that Congress intended to treat “formal deniers” 
different than “deemed deniers” for statute of limitations purposes.
What the Supreme Court said over a century ago (in a borrowing case, 
no less) is particularly relevant in the deemed-denial context: “[W]e
[would] have the anomaly of a distinct class of actions subject to no 
limitation whatever; a class of privileged plaintiffs who, in this 
particular, are outside the pale of the law, and subject to no limitation of
time in which they may institute their actions.”211 
In short, it is plain that a no-limitations rule for deemed denials harms 
all four groups Congress intended to benefit: courts will have to deal
with repetitive filings over an indefinite period of time; FTCA claimants 
who receive formal denials are subjected to a more narrow window 
within which to file suit than deemed deniers; the Justice Department,
perhaps years later, will have to relitigate suits that have been litigated
and dismissed; and agencies will have to locate witnesses whose 
memories will surely have faded and documents that may have been 
destroyed.  It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that the borrowing
principle should not be applied to the deemed-denial problem because 
Congress’s silence somehow promotes a legislative policy objective. 
b. The Formal-Denial Escape Hatch 
Last, but certainly not least, I now address perhaps the best (yet, 
ultimately unpersuasive) argument against application of the borrowing 
principle to the deemed-denial problem.  It could be argued that the 
United States cannot complain about the statute of limitations problem 
posed by deemed denials because the United States ultimately has the 
power to trigger the six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) by issuing 
a formal, written denial after an FTCA claimant has deemed her claim 
denied. Congress, the argument would go, did not waive the United
States’ sovereign immunity to the extent that no limitations period 
applies to deemed denials because Congress intended to have 
211. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895). 
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administrative agencies come to a final decision on all tort claims filed
against the United States.  The formal-denial “escape” hatch, however,
provides no escape at all from the borrowing principle. 
The formal-denial argument, of course, is beside the point. 
Suggesting that the statute of limitations problem can be avoided by
issuing a formal agency denial is to provide no answer at all to the 
question of whether a statute of limitation applies to deemed denials. 
Section 2675(a) prescribes two mutually exclusive methods of 
administrative exhaustion, and pointing to one method as a solution to 
the problem posed by the second method of exhaustion is a classic red
herring. More to the point, the formal-denial “escape” hatch cannot
serve as a permissible construction of the FTCA because it (1) is
fundamentally at odds with the doctrine of administrative exhaustion
codified in § 2675(a); (2) is inconsistent with § 1346(b)(1) jurisdiction 
that is triggered once an FTCA claimant has exhausted her 
administrative remedies and filed suit; (3) suggests that a deemed denial 
is no longer a “final denial,” contrary to the plain terms of § 2675(a); 
and (4) is irreconcilable with the administrative-settlement scheme of the
FTCA. 
When an FTCA claimant deems a claim denied by filing suit, well 
accepted doctrines of administrative exhaustion in general and the
administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA in particular compel the
conclusion that an agency is then powerless to issue a legally effective
formal denial.212 The doctrine of administrative exhaustion holds that a
plaintiff has gone through a legislatively-prescribed administrative 
process and been unsuccessful in obtaining relief via that process.
Exhaustion, then, means that an FTCA claimant was unable to settle her
claim in the agency and therefore can obtain relief only (if at all) in an
Article III court.  Because formal denials and deemed denials present
two equally valid ways to exhaust FTCA administrative remedies, it 
must follow that when an FTCA claimant deems her claim denied, she is
saying that her case cannot be settled within the administrative agency.
Once an FTCA claimant exhausts her administrative remedies and files
suit, § 1346(b)(1) invests Article III courts with exclusive jurisdiction 
over the claim.213 Thus, when an FTCA claimant deems her claim denied
by filing suit, agency issuance of a formal written denial has no legal 
212. See supra Part I.B.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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effect because the agency itself no longer has jurisdiction over the 
claim.214 
To say that an agency thereafter has the authority to interpose a formal
denial suggests that the agency may unilaterally conclude that the FTCA
claimant’s remedies had not, in fact, been exhausted.  There are a
number of problems with this reading of § 2675(a).  First, such a 
construction of the FTCA suggests that a deemed denial is no longer a 
“final” denial—contrary to the express terms of § 2675(a).  This is an
impermissible interpretation of the FTCA, for a cardinal rule of statutory
construction is that words in a statute are to be given their ordinary, 
common-sense meaning.215 It is self-evident that a purportedly effective
formal denial interposed after a deemed denial strips the deemed denial 
of finality.
Second, the contention that an administrative agency has the power to
issue a formal denial after an FTCA claimant has deemed her claim 
denied by filing suit is flatly inconsistent with the doctrine of 
administrative exhaustion and the plain language of § 1346(b)(1). 
Plainly, an FTCA claimant cannot exhaust her administrative remedies 
twice; exhaustion means exhaustion, not quasi-exhaustion.  Likewise, 
once an FTCA administrative claim has been finally denied through the 
filing of a lawsuit, § 1346 jurisdiction is triggered, and that jurisdiction 
is exclusive of any other adjudicative body.216 An Article III court 
cannot logically have exclusive jurisdiction over a deemed-denial 
lawsuit if an administrative agency retains the authority to adjudicate
and deny the claim.  Jurisdiction means jurisdiction, not some curious 
notion that an FTCA claimant straddles a jurisdictional fence when she
deems her claim denied by filing suit.
That the formal-denial argument is inconsistent with the doctrines of 
exhaustion and Article III jurisdiction is illustrated further by
considering agency regulations governing FTCA claims.  For instance,
the Department of Energy permits claimants to seek reconsideration of a 
final, formal agency denial.217 If a formal denial, issued after a claim has
214. See supra Part I.B. But see Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1013-15 
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that agency has power to issue formal denial after FTCA plaintiff
has exercised the deeming option by filing suit). 
215. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993); 
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993). 
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See 10 C.F.R. § 1014.9(b) (1997).  Whether reconsideration of a formal, final 
denial represents a permissible construction of the FTCA is, under the case law, unclear. 
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 351, 353-57 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that
agency regulation permitting reconsideration is not jurisdictional and therefore cannot
contravene the plain terms of § 2401(b) or § 2675(a)).  This Article expresses no opinion 
on this issue, but merely uses the reconsideration regulation as a means of demonstrating
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been deemed denied through the filing of a lawsuit, is legally effective,
the right to seek reconsideration of the final denial must also be
triggered. It would certainly be odd to suggest that Congress 
contemplated that a claimant could, after filing a lawsuit in an Article III
court due to agency inaction, turn back around and seek reconsideration 
with the agency that failed to act on the claim until administrative 
remedies already had been exhausted.  There would be nothing for the 
agency to reconsider because the claimant has taken her tort claim to
court. And, in any event, the agency could not reconsider the claim 
because the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim.
Third, the “logic” of the post-exhaustion-exhaustion argument leads to 
the anomalous result that an FTCA claimant can deem her claim denied 
by filing suit, yet, at some point in the future, an agency can present the
claimant with a settlement offer.  Although this may arguably comport 
with Congress’s intent to settle claims within administrative agencies,218 
such a result is simply irreconcilable with the doctrine of exhaustion.
Interjecting a settlement offer after a deemed denial plainly suggests that
the FTCA claimant still has available to her the prescribed
administrative remedy of settlement.  This is wholly at odds with the 
well established rule that administrative exhaustion opens the door to §
1346(b)(1) jurisdiction, investing Article III courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over an FTCA lawsuit. 
With respect to written-notice deemed denials, to suggest that an 
agency may interpose a legally effective formal denial after a written-
notice deemed denial is to write the deeming option out of § 2675(a).  A 
deemed denial would no longer be a “final denial”—contrary to the 
express terms of § 2675(a)—and would thereby be rendered
the fallacy, from a real-world perspective, of suggesting that the formal-denial argument
solves the statute of limitations problem posed by the deeming option. 
218. Promoting the policy of settlement by permitting agencies to interject 
settlement proposals after an FTCA claimant has deemed her claim denied and filed suit
is a cure worse than the disease.  In addition to contravening the plain terms of §
2675(a), gutting the doctrine of administrative exhaustion codified in § 2675(a), and
rendering hollow the well-established principle that exhaustion of FTCA administrative
remedies is a condition precedent to invoking Article III jurisdiction, the argument is 
belied by the text of the FTCA.  Just as Congress could not have intended to permit 
administrative agencies to interpose formal denials after a deemed denial, it surely could 
not have intended agencies to present settlement offers to FTCA claimants after they
have invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court.  The text of the FTCA states as much. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (1994) (“The Attorney General or his designee may arbitrate, 
compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, after the
commencement of an action thereon.” (emphasis added)). 
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meaningless.  This is an impermissible construction of the FTCA, for
another cardinal rule of statutory construction is that every word in a 
statute must be interpreted, to the extent possible, as having some
operative effect.219 And, as I have suggested, the principle of primary 
jurisdiction codified in the FTCA compels the conclusion that, when
there has been a final denial of an administrative claim and a lawsuit has
not yet been filed, the FTCA claimant lingers in jurisdictional limbo, not
that an agency somehow retains adjudicatory powers over a claim that,
by definition, can no longer be resolved in the administrative process.220 
To illustrate this point further, consider the following hypothetical.
Suppose an agency formally denies a claim and the FTCA claimant 
thereafter deems the claim denied either by written notice or by filing a
lawsuit. The FTCA claimant surely cannot colorably contend that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies occurred when she deemed her 
claim denied.  The agency’s formal denial was a “final denial” for
purposes of administrative exhaustion.  Because Congress defined
formal and deemed denials as “final denials” for purposes of
administrative exhaustion, the converse also must therefore be true: 
Once an FTCA claimant appropriately deems her claim denied—a “final 
denial” for purposes of § 2675(a)—administrative remedies have been
exhausted and federal district courts may exercise Article III jurisdiction
over a subsequently filed lawsuit.  Just as an FTCA claimant is
powerless to alter this statutory scheme, so too is an agency. 
Finally, permitting agencies to interpose formal denials after an FTCA 
claimant has deemed a claim denied (by either filing suit or providing an 
agency written notice of the deemed-denial decision) is flatly
inconsistent with the settlement scheme Congress created in 1966. 
Indeed, the suggestion that administrative agencies have the power to
trigger the six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) by issuing a formal 
denial assumes (wrongly) that Congress intended that all administrative
claims be finally adjudicated by agencies.  Congress was well aware that
some administrative claims could not be settled within the six-month
time frame prescribed in § 2675(a); thus, it encouraged the FTCA 
claimant and the agency to continue negotiations until the claim is 
finally resolved.221 At the same time, however, Congress did not intend 
that all administrative claims be finally determined by agencies.222 
219. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992). 
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 8; S.
REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 5. 
222. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 13 (“Thus, even though this six months period
may prove insufficient in some instances, we do not believe that this period ought to be 
enlarged to attempt to insure time for final decision on all claims.” (emphasis added)); 
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Rather, Congress declined to enlarge the six-month settlement period, 
providing the FTCA claimant an option to deem her claim denied any
time after the six-month period expired.223 Obviously, Congress
understood that once the FTCA claimant pulled out of the 
administrative-settlement process by deeming a claim denied, that
process was at an end.  Therefore, Congress could not have intended to 
further the policy of settlement by permitting agencies formally to deny
claims once an FTCA claimant has exhausted her administrative 
remedies and stands ready to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III 
court. 
In sum, the formal-denial argument does not represent a viable 
construction of the FTCA and therefore does not bring the deemed-
denial problem within the ambit of the second exception to the 
borrowing principle.  Accordingly, suggesting that an administrative 
agency can interpose a formal denial after an FTCA claimant has 
deemed her claim denied reduces the Congressional settlement scheme 
to an absurdity. Did Congress intend to put the Justice Department to 
the Hobson’s choice of either construing the FTCA in an untenable 
manner or face the unacceptable prospect of defending stale claims?
Congress did no such thing. The borrowing principle should be applied 
to close the statute of limitations gap in the FTCA. 
V. THE DEEMED-DENIAL CASES: THE BORROWING PRINCIPLE 

OVERLOOKED, THE FTCA MISUNDERSTOOD
 
When presented with the statute of limitations problem posed by the 
deemed-denial option, however, some courts have come to a different 
conclusion.  They have held that no limitations period applies to 
deemed-denial lawsuits.224 Courts have provided four justifications for
H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 8 (same); S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 5 
(same). 
223. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 21, at 8; S.
REP. NO. 1327, supra note 21, at 5. 
224. See Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1013-15 (9th Cir. 1998); Pascale 
v. United States, 998 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1993); Parker v. United States, 935 F.2d 176 (9th
Cir. 1991); Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 701 F. Supp. 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).  It 
should be noted that Pascale, Parker, and Hannon all dealt with Rule 4 dismissals and 
that Rule 4 has since been amended to prevent the problems encountered by the plaintiffs 
in those cases. Rule 4(i)(3) now “allow[s] a reasonable time for service of process under
this subdivision for the purpose of curing the failure to serve multiple officers, agencies, 
or corporations of the United States if the plaintiff has effected service on either the
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this conclusion.225 First, Congress failed to account for the deeming 
option in § 2401(b), and that failure evinces an intent not to impose a 
limitations period on deemed denials.226 Second, the deemed-denial
option was designed to protect FTCA claimants from unreasonable 
agency delay in claims processing, thereby making it inequitable to 
impose a limitations period on FTCA claimants who have waited the 
administrative process out.227 Third, the United States can, at any time, 
issue a formal denial and trigger the six-month limitations period in § 
2401(b), rendering unpersuasive the contention that by not imposing a
limitations period on deemed denials, the United States is forced to
defend stale claims.228 Fourth, nothing in the text of the FTCA or the
legislative history states that an FTCA claimant can only deem a claim 
denied once, so that an FTCA claimant may repeatedly file suit and 
avoid a statute of limitations defense.229 None of these rationales is 
persuasive. 
The basic flaw in the decisions is that they overlook the borrowing 
principle. For example, in Pascale v. United States,230 the Third Circuit,
interpreting § 2401(b), reasoned that “if Congress had intended the six-
month statute of limitations in section 2401(b) . . . to apply also when a 
claimant has exercised the deeming option under section 2675(a), we 
can assume it would have so stated.”231 Of course, this statement is flatly 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s clear admonition that when
United States attorney or the Attorney General of the United States.”  FED. R. CIV. P.
4(i)(3).  Added in 1993, this new provision “saves the plaintiff from the hazard of losing 
a substantive right because of failure to comply with the complex requirements of
multiple service under this subdivision.”  Advisory Committee Note on 1993 
Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 4 Subdivision (i).
225. A fifth argument was provided by the district court in Hannon, in which the
court concluded that the “any time thereafter” language in § 2675(a) replaces § 2401(b) 
as the statute of limitations applicable to the deeming option.  Hannon, 701 F. Supp. at
389. As I have pointed out, a plain reading of § 2675(a) suggests that an FTCA claimant 
has an indefinite period within which to exhaust her administrative remedies in the face
of agency inaction, not that she has an indefinite period within which to file suit.  See 
supra notes 28-34, 154-56 and accompanying text.  The deeming option can be exercised 
in any number of ways, one of which consists of filing a lawsuit.  The means by which a
claimant deems a claim denied is immaterial.  See supra notes 157-164 and 
accompanying text.  Deeming a claim denied satisfies the condition precedent to 
conferring § 1346 jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain an FTCA claimant’s suit— 
nothing more, nothing less. 
226. See Pascale, 998 F.2d at 188; Parker, 935 F.2d at 177; Hannon, 701 F. Supp. 
at 389. 
227. See Pascale, 998 F.2d at 189-90; Parker, 935 F.2d at 177-78; Hannon, 701 F. 
Supp. at 389.
228. See Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1013-15; Pascale, 998 F.2d at 192; Parker, 935 F.2d
at 177-78; Hannon, 701 F. Supp. at 389 n.7. 
229. See Pascale, 998 F.2d at 191; Hannon, 701 F. Supp. at 390. 
230. Pascale, 998 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1993). 
231. Id. at 188 (emphasis added). 
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Congress is silent on the limitations issue, courts should “assume that 
Congress intends . . . that [courts] borrow state[-]law [statutes of 
limitations].”232 Put simply, the Supreme Court has said that silence 
triggers borrowing, whereas Pascale and other lower courts interpreting
the deeming option have held that Congress’s silence requires courts to
assume that no limitations period applies.233 
Moreover, anchoring a no-limitations rule to Congress’s intent to 
provide more fair and equitable treatment to FTCA claimants represents
a myopic reading of the legislative history.  It is true, of course, that the 
1966 amendments were intended to provide a dispute-resolution scheme 
beneficial to FTCA claimants.  But the purposes of the 1966 
amendments were much broader than that.  Congress sought to decrease 
court congestion, avoid unnecessary litigation, and provide a more fair
dispute-resolution system for FTCA claimants and the United States. 234 
Accordingly, an analysis of the statute of limitations problem posed by 
deemed denials must take all of these policy objectives into account, 
something courts have simply failed to do.235 Plainly, although a no-
limitations rule benefits deemed deniers, such a rule undermines 
Congress’s other objectives of decreasing court congestion, avoiding 
unnecessary litigation, and providing a dispute-resolution scheme that
benefits the United States and administrative agencies.236 
In addition, the act of deeming a claim denied is taken by the FTCA 
claimant; it is not forced on her by the United States or anybody else. 
Assuming the administrative agency does not interpose a formal denial,
the language of § 2675(a) unambiguously gives the FTCA claimant
complete control over her legal options once the six-month settlement 
period expires, so that any action taken by the claimant which deems an
administrative claim denied is taken at her own peril.  Plainly, the 
232. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987). 
233. Id. 
234. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
235. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 933 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(Thomas, J., and  Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stating as unreliable “a series of 
partisan statements about purposes and objectives collected by congressional staffers and
packaged into a Committee Report”); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10 n.20 
(1962) (“[W]e are not persuaded to allow an isolated piece of legislative history to 
detract from the [FTCA] the words Congress expressly employed.”); Indian Towing Co. 
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) (“Loose general statements in the legislative 
history to which the Government points seem directed mainly toward [a different
statutory provision in the FTCA] and are not persuasive.”). 
236. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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government cannot place the FTCA claimant in any sort of legal 
straightjacket when the six-month settlement period expires.  She has the 
“option” to deem a claim denied at “any time.”237 But once she deems a
claim denied by filing suit or by taking some other action, the
administrative settlement process has come to an end.  As such, all of the
legal consequences that accompany administrative exhaustion (i.e., 
triggering a statute of limitations) apply.  It is therefore wrong to
characterize a procedure that provides the FTCA claimant with total
control of her legal situation as somehow brow-beating the FTCA 
claimant in an inequitable manner.238 
More to the point, the argument that it would be inequitable to impose 
a six-month limitations period on deemed denials simply proves too
much.  Claimants receiving formal denials may also be subjected to the 
precise “inequitable” situation contemplated by the courts.  Suppose a
claimant receives a formal denial of her claim, filed suit, and had that 
suit dismissed without prejudice.  Assume further that the claimant then 
filed a second suit more than six months after receiving the formal
denial. The second suit plainly would have been time barred.  Congress 
knew this, yet prescribed a six-month limitations period for claimants
receiving formal denials. The inequity argument reduces to the wholly
insupportable contention that Congress accorded deemed deniers some 
special statute of limitations status.  There is not the slightest hint in the
legislative history to support such a construction of the FTCA, and
nothing in the cases suggests otherwise.
Furthermore, the suggestion that the United States can trigger the six-
month period in § 2401(b) by having agencies issue formal denials after 
a claimant has deemed her claim denied by filing suit is fundamentally
inconsistent with § 1346(b)(1).  When FTCA plaintiffs deemed their 
claims denied by filing suit—as each of the plaintiffs did in the cases
that have discussed the limitations problem posed by the deeming
option—the district courts retained “exclusive jurisdiction” over those 
claims.239 If the term “exclusive” means anything, it surely means that
only federal district courts—and, obviously, not federal agencies—have 
the power to adjudicate those claims.  A proper reading of the FTCA
therefore renders illusory the courts’ suggestion that a formal denial, 
issued after a claimant deems a claim denied by filing suit, protects the 
237. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
238. See, e.g., Leaman v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities,
825 F.2d 946, 956 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that FTCA claimants can control whether or 
not they accept an agency’s settlement offer, rendering unpersuasive the contention that 
the consequences of plaintiff’s unreasonable choice somehow create an unconstitutional 
condition), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988). 
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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United States’ interest in repose. 
Finally, the suggestion that an FTCA claimant may deem a claim 
denied more than once is belied by the plain language of § 2675(a). 
According to the Third Circuit in Pascale v. United States: 
There is no statutory language indicating that a claimant can only deem a claim
denied once. The “option” language appears in the phrase which provides that a 
claim can be denied “at the option of the claimant any time thereafter,” and 
refers only to the timing of claimant’s decision to file suit, not to any arbitrary 
limit on the number of times the deeming option can be exercised.240 
Contrary to the Pascale Court’s assertion that “no” statutory language
supports the proposition that a claimant may deem a claim denied only 
once, § 2675(a) does in fact contain such language.  Section 2675(a) 
states that a deemed denial “shall . . . be deemed a final denial.”241 
“Final” is defined as “of or coming at the end; last; concluding . . . 
leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change; deciding; 
conclusive . . . having to do with the basic or ultimate purpose, aim, or 
end . . . .”242 Because a bedrock principle of statutory construction is that
words in a statute are to be accorded an “ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning,”243 the Third Circuit’s construction of § 2675(a) is
simply not a permissible one.  To say that an FTCA claimant can deem a
claim “finally” denied more than once stretches the definition of “final”
beyond any “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”244 And 
because Congress chose the mandatory “shall” (as opposed to a 
discretionary “may”), there certainly can be no room for arguing that a 
“final denial” is anything but that—final. 
CONCLUSION
So, should Jack’s suit and Jill’s second suit be time-barred?  This 
Article suggests that both suits ought to be barred by the six-month 
limitations period in § 2401(b).245 Jack exhausted his FTCA 
240. 998 F.2d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1993) (first emphasis added). 
241. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
242. Webster’s New World Dictionary 506 (3d college ed. 1991). 
243. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) 
(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
244. Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993) (holding that 
common-sense construction of “country” in § 2680(k) of the FTCA can be gleaned from 
a dictionary).
245. This Article does not address the question of whether the six-month limitations
period in § 2401(b) should be equitably tolled.  For an argument that equitable tolling is 
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administrative remedies on June 16, 1991, when he deemed his claim 
denied by providing the Postal Service written notice of the deemed-
denial decision more than six months after he submitted his claim to the 
Service. Because the borrowing principle requires application of the six-
month limitations period in § 2401(b) to deemed denials, Jack had six 
months within which to file suit against the United States in federal 
district court. His suit, however, was filed one year after he exhausted
his remedies and therefore is time-barred.  So too with Jill.  She 
exhausted her administrative remedies on November 25, 1975, when she 
deemed her claim denied by filing suit.  To be timely, her second suit
had to be filed no later than May 26, 1976.  Because it was filed twenty 
years after the claim was deemed denied, Jill’s second suit would also be 
time-barred. 
Neither result is unfair. When Congress prescribed a six-month 
limitations period in § 2401(b), it struck the balance between the policies 
of repose and diligence that represented the extent to which Congress 
was willing to waive the United States’ immunity from tort suits.  With
respect to Jill’s second suit, one may well question the fairness of
barring her subsequent suit because, after all, she did not have the
epidemiological evidence to prove her case until years after she filed
suit. However, this is no reason to hold that the six-month limitations 
period in § 2401(b) should not bar the claim.  As I have suggested, by
permitting claimants to deem a claim denied “any time” after the 
mandatory, six-month settlement period expires, Jill could have very
well waited and not deemed her claim denied until she had the evidence 
to prove medical causation.  Indeed, nothing in the legislative history or
the text of the FTCA precludes Jill from striking a deal with the agency, 
in which the agency agrees not to issue a formal denial until Jill has 
mustered the evidence to prove her claim.  In this way, the FTCA,  
through its exhaustion provision, permits claimants suffering from 
insidious disease to avoid the FTCA’s restrictive six-month limitations 
period.  Of course, if Jill did in fact strike such a deal, deemed her claim 
denied by filing suit, and then had that suit dismissed, a second suit filed 
by Jill six months after the deemed denial would, and should, be time-
barred. 
In short, an analysis of Jack’s and Jill’s predicament should proceed as 
if the two had received formal denials.  This conclusion must follow 
because nothing in the legislative history accompanying the 1966 
amendments to the FTCA suggests that deemed deniers should be 
treated differently, for statute of limitations purposes, than formal
inconsistent with Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA, see Parker & 
Collela, supra note 6. 
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deniers. In doing so, FTCA claimants who exhaust their administrative 
remedies—whether through a formal denial, a written-notice deemed
denial, a lawsuit that deems a claim denied, or some other method of
exercising the deeming option—are subject to a uniform and predictable 
limitations period, a result that has proved hard to come by when the 
borrowing principle has been applied.
The statute of limitations problem presented by the deeming option of
the FTCA is far from being conclusively resolved.  The Supreme Court 
has not decided the issue, nor have a majority of the Circuits.  Courts 
that have not addressed the deemed-denial problem should conclude that 
the six-month limitations period in § 2401(b) applies to deemed denials. 
The borrowing principle compels it, the policy goals of the 1966
amendments fully comport with that conclusion, and the intended 
beneficiaries of the revamped FTCA dispute-resolution process certainly 
require it to obtain the legislatively-prescribed benefits.  To hold 
otherwise permits deemed deniers to whip-saw the United States with
the new and improved administrative-settlement process created by
Congress in a manner that undermines the purposes behind the 1966 
changes to the FTCA.
In McNeil v. United States,246 the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of interpreting the FTCA in a manner that promotes the 
orderly administration of tort claims brought against the United States.247 
Those courts that have held that deemed deniers are not subject to a 
limitations period have put the orderly administration of the FTCA 
beyond the reach of the Justice Department.  As I have suggested, those 
courts’ suggestion that the United States can avoid limitations problems
through the formal-denial mechanism requires the Justice Department to
interpret § 2675(a) in a manner that distorts the doctrine of 
administrative exhaustion codified in § 2675(a), and renders hollow (if 
not meaningless) the bedrock principle that exhaustion of FTCA
administrative remedies is a condition precedent to invoking § 1346 
jurisdiction. As the chief law enforcement agency of the United States,
the Justice Department should not be put to the false choice of either 
erroneously interpreting the FTCA or facing the disturbing prospect of 
having to defend stale claims.  In addition, courts have transformed a 
relatively straightforward dispute-resolution scheme (if the six-month
246. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). 
247. Id. at 112 (“The interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is
best served by adherence to the straightforward statutory command.”). 
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limitations period in § 2401(b) were applied to deemed denials) into a 
confusing hodge-podge, in which FTCA claimants, the Justice 
Department, and administrative agencies become embroiled in a chess
match to decipher who can deny what, when, and what legal 
consequences attach to each move.  This surely cannot be what Congress 
intended when it amended the FTCA in 1966 to provide a more orderly 
and equitable dispute-resolution system for claimants, agencies, and the 
Justice Department. 
The venerable Justice Holmes wrote, “[I]t is not an adequate discharge
of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at [Congress], but
you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.”248 This
statement captures well the statute of limitations problem posed by 
deemed denials.  Courts, on the one hand, have marveled at Congress’s
failure to impose a limitations period on deemed denials, yet, on the 
other hand, have simply failed to apply the appropriate method of 
statutory construction in the face of congressional silence on the 
limitations issue.  Congress’s failure to prescribe a limitations period for 
deemed denials is nothing more than a legislative oversight, one that 
requires minor statutory surgery to correct.  The borrowing principle—as
it has developed over the past 160 years—was designed to do just that, 
providing courts with a viable tool with which to close this unjustifiable 
gap in federal law. 
248. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
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